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“WE NEED PROTECTION FROM OUR
PROTECTORS”:* THE NATURE, ISSUES,
AND FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIANS
Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear** & Matthew L.M. Fletcher***
ABSTRACT
The federal trust responsibility to Indians essentially entails duties of good
faith, loyalty, and protection.  While often thought of as unique to federal Indian
policy, it developed from and reflects common law principles of contracts, prop-
erty, trusts, foreign relations/international law, and constitutional law.  How-
ever, several issues preclude a greater understanding and implementation of the
federal trust responsibility.  These include Executive Branch efforts to avoid lia-
bility, neocolonial judicial activism, and episodic congressional attention.  Enact-
ment of legislation to reaffirm and modernize the federal trust responsibility
through greater self-determination, integration, elevation, oversight, and funding
should help overcome these issues to improve federal Indian policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite concerted federal efforts to address the political, social, and
economic status of American Indians over the last two centuries, including
hundreds of treaties and an entire Title of the United States Code, Indians
continue to suffer disproportionately poor levels of health, education, and
employment.1  During this time, federal policies have varied over many
eras, including treaty-making, removal, reservations, assimilation, reorgani-
zation, termination, and self-determination.2  The current self-determina-
tion era has lasted for roughly fifty years, and accomplished much, but
many basic problems remain.  This includes ongoing American Indian
struggles for meaningful economic development, sufficient employment op-
portunities, quality education, decent housing, adequate healthcare, and
sound infrastructure.  There also are recurring high-profile conflicts be-
tween Indian interests and others that require federal decision-making.3
1. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20–23 (7th ed.
2017).
2. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 3.1–.15, at 51–116 (2016).
3. Just a few recent examples as of the writing of this Article include the construction
of the Dakota Access Pipeline across the Missouri River just upstream of the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation, the possible construction of a wall along the United States-Mexico border
within the Tohono O’odham Reservation, and the establishment of Bears Ears National
Monument in Utah in part to protect land sacred to five Indian tribes despite the opposition
of state leaders. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, The Legal Case for Blocking the Dakota Access Pipe-
line, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/
dapl-dakota-sitting-rock-sioux/499178/; Fernanda Santos, Border Wall Would Cleave Tribe, and
Its Connection to Ancestral Land, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/20/us/border-wall-tribe.html?_r=0; Robinson Meyer, Obama’s Environmental Legacy, in
Two Buttes, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/
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What underlies all these evolving efforts and ongoing issues?  Also, why
is it taking so long for American Indians to achieve a socio-economic status
roughly level with other Americans?  Thinking prospectively, what basic
principles could or should support a new generation or paradigm of federal
policy and tribal relations to achieve significant further improvements in
Indian welfare?  In the field of federal Indian law, one bedrock principle
underlying federal-tribal relations may be essential to future policy develop-
ment but is often misunderstood: the federal trust responsibility to Indian
tribes and individual Indians.
The federal trust responsibility in essence entails duties of good faith,
loyalty, and protection, and has been variously characterized as a corner-
stone of federal Indian law and essentially just a mere platitude.4  The trust
responsibility is a name describing the relationship between Indian tribes
and the United States, which involves a duty of protection to Indians and
tribes, and defies categorical definition.  Also, numerous court decisions,
federal studies, and academic reviews have described and assessed the doc-
trine, and many recent lawsuits based on it have led to billions of dollars in
settlements,5 while many social and economic issues for Indians remain out-
standing.  Therefore, an improved understanding of the basic principle is
needed.  For this, it may be helpful to better define how this essential aspect
of federal Indian law fits within the larger American legal landscape, and
how or why that understanding has been lost, in order to better address
ongoing federal-Indian policy issues.  Hopefully, a better understanding of
12/?obamas-environmental-legacy-in-two-buttes/511889/ (discussing the controversy sur-
rounding Bears Ears National Monument).
4. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at XI (1941) [herein-
after COHEN’S HANDBOOK 1941] (noting competing views and that “the theory of American
law governing Indian affairs has always been that the Government owed a duty of protection
to the Indian in his relations with non-Indians”). Compare Fletcher, supra note 2, § 5.2, and R
FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[3][a] (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2015], with Reid P. Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1227 (1975)
(arguing that courts improperly treat the trust duty as “a moral obligation, without justiciable
standards for its enforcement”), and Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525
F.3d 23, 36–37 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Chambers, supra, in ruling against Indian interests).
5. E.g., Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding $3.412 billion
class action settlement); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder and
Secretary Salazar Announce $1 Billion Settlement of Tribal Trust Accounting and Manage-
ment Lawsuits Filed By More Than 40 Tribes (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/attorney-general-holder-and-secretary-salazar-announce-1-billion-settlement-tribal-trust;
Sari Horwitz, U.S. to Pay Navajo Nation $554 Million in Largest Settlement with Single Indian
Tribe, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-to-pay-navajo-nation-554-million-in-largest-settlement-with-single-indian-tribe/
2014/09/24/4dc02cc6-434e-11e4-9a15-137aa0153?527_story.html?utm_term=.783179a639e6.
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the federal trust responsibility will help inform and shape future federal
Indian policy.
First, while many have defined the federal trust responsibility to Indi-
ans as a unique feature in the relatively narrow field of federal Indian law, it
may be better understood within a broader legal context.  The trust respon-
sibility may be best defined through a combination of basic principles com-
mon to many first- and second-year law school subjects: contracts, property,
trusts, foreign relations, and constitutional law.  Second, this multifaceted
legal nature of the federal trust responsibility has been obscured during the
current self-determination era by Executive Branch efforts to evade liabil-
ity, neocolonial judicial activism, and episodic congressional attention, as
explained below.  This combination of issues allows Indian interests to be
marginalized when they could and should be better protected.  Moving for-
ward, Congress should reassert its authority to protect and empower Indi-
ans in order to better fulfill the federal trust responsibility and lay a
foundation for future efforts to improve the status of Indians.  This should
be done through federal legislation that reaffirms the basic nature and scope
of the trust responsibility; recognizes greater tribal sovereignty; integrates,
elevates, and provides ongoing oversight for Indian affairs; and provides
sufficient funding to accomplish those goals.
II. THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
The common characterization of the federal-Indian relationship as
“unique” or sui generis6 may not be helpful to understand the relationship.
This is especially true for the federal trust responsibility that is the sine qua
non of federal-Indian relations.  For example, merely stating that “ ‘[t]he
general relationship between the United States and Indian tribes is not com-
parable to a private trust relationship’”7 does not clarify what the former
relationship means, or what the federal duties are in the context of manag-
ing specific Indian trust assets.  Rather than merely state that the federal-
Indian trust responsibility differs from other legal concepts in American
6. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty that
the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 554 (1974) (“In the sense that there is no other group of people favored in this manner,
the legal status of the BIA [(Bureau of Indian Affairs)] is truly sui generis.”) (citation omit-
ted); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831) (“The condition of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence . . .
[and] is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.”).
7. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation (Jicarilla VII), 564 U.S. 162, 173 (2011)
(citation omitted).
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jurisprudence,8 it would be more helpful to consider it in the context of
better-understood American jurisprudence in other, more common areas of
law.
Basic common-law legal principles in other fields explain and provide
sound legal bases for several basic aspects of federal-Indian relations.  First,
federal-tribal relations necessarily derive from and concern the law of con-
tracts and property because those relations concern agreements between
parties about the possession and management of property.  Second, because
these relations historically came about through dealings between Indian
tribes and other sovereigns that assumed responsibility over Indian affairs
before the establishment of the United States, another fundamental attri-
bute of the federal trust responsibility is a combination of trust law and the
international law of foreign relations.  Finally, because the United States
Constitution authorized Congress to enact laws governing Indian affairs,
the federal trust responsibility also is a matter of constitutional law.  Each
of these is discussed in turn below.
A. Contracts and Property Law
Federal-tribal relations and the federal-Indian trust responsibility arose
from historic dealings involving basic aspects of contracts and property law.
The Restatement of Contracts recognizes that a “contract is a promise or a
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”9  As any
first-year law student should know, a contract consists of an offer, accept-
ance, consideration, mutuality, competency and capacity and, in some situa-
tions, a reduction to writing.10  Once a contract is established between
parties, each has a legal duty to perform their promise as well as a duty of
good faith and fair dealing.11  The latter means honesty-in-fact in relevant
conduct,12 including faithfulness and consistency with the justified expecta-
tions of the other party.13  In layman’s terms, this means loyalty.
8. Cf. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993) (noting a common
view of federal Indian law as “a tiny backwater of law inhabited by impenetrably complex and
dull issues”).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM . LAW INST. 1981).
10. See generally id. at ch. 2 (parties and capacity), ch. 3 (mutual assent), ch. 4 (discuss-
ing consideration), ch. 5 (statute of frauds).
11. Id. §§ 1 (contract defined), 205 (good faith and fair dealing).
12. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(20), 2-103(1)(b) (AM . LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
CO M M’N 1999).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2, cmt. a (AM . LAW INST. 1981).
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The federal-tribal trust relationship is based in part on these principles,
because the treaties which historically provided the basis of federal-tribal
relations were fundamentally and necessarily contracts.  In particular, fed-
eral-Indian treaties and agreements are essentially contracts between sover-
eign nations, which typically secured peace with Indian tribes in exchange
for land cessions, which provided legal consideration for the ongoing per-
formance of federal trust duties.14  In terms of consideration, it is beyond
question that the United States has long reaped the benefit of vast cessions
of Indian lands in exchange for its voluntarily and unilaterally imposed trust
relationship.15  Moreover, federal courts “have long held that when it comes
to protecting tribal rights against non-federal interests, it makes no differ-
ence whether those rights derive from treaty, statute or executive order,
unless Congress has provided otherwise.”16  This is in part because “non-
treaty enactments” and congressionally-authorized Executive Orders often
“‘embody agreements with tribes that would have been handled by treaty
in former eras.’ ”17
Congress recently has recognized the contractual nature of federal-tri-
bal relations in the following legislative findings:
[T]he fiduciary responsibilities of the United States to Indians also
are founded in part on specific commitments made through written
treaties and agreements securing peace, in exchange for which Indi-
ans have surrendered claims to vast tracts of land, which provided
legal consideration for permanent, ongoing performance of Federal
trust duties; and
. . . the foregoing historic Federal-tribal relations and understand-
ings have benefitted the people of the United States as a whole for
centuries and have established enduring and enforceable Federal
obligations to which the national honor has been committed.18
14. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979) (“A treaty, including one between the United States and an Indian tribe, is
essentially a contract between two sovereign nations.”).  Formal treaty-making with Indian
tribes ended with the Act of March 3, 1871, so subsequent analogous federal-tribal agree-
ments must be approved by legislation, rather than just by the Senate. See 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2012).
15. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 240 F.3d 1081, 1110
(D.C. Cir. 2001); H.R. REP . NO. 103-778, at 9–10 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3467, 3468–69.
16. Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing decisions from 1899,
1901, and 1976).
17. Id. (quoting Frickey, supra note 8, at 421 & n.164). R
18. Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, Pub. L. 114-178, § 101(4)–(5), 130 Stat. 432, 433
(2016) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5601(4)–(5)).
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In turn, the Supreme Court has characterized the relationship as follows:
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States
overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes
by force, leaving them . . . dependent people, needing protection
against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence.  Of
necessity, the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that
protection, and with it the authority to do all that was required to
perform that obligation.19
Not only did tribes’ treaties establish enumerated duties, but treaties are
reservations of rights not surrendered by tribes.20  Also, federal-Indian trea-
ties must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood the terms,
with additional rights implied to give effect to treaties.21
Accordingly, the federal trust responsibility is not a gratuity, and the
assertion that federal Indian policies and benefits are provided to Indians at
no cost to Indians22 is a mischaracterization of historical fact.  Rather, fed-
eral duties to Indians exist and remain enforceable because “the government
‘has over the years made specific commitments to the Indian people
through written treaties and through informal and formal agreements,’ in
exchange for which ‘Indians . . . have often surrendered claims to vast
tracts of land.’”23  Therefore, provisions of Indian treaties and agreements
19. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) (quoting Board of County Comm’rs
v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943)); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 548–54 (1832)
(discussing treaties securing and preserving friendship and land cessions, and noting that the
stipulation acknowledging tribes to be “under the protection of the United States” “is found
in Indian treaties generally”).
20. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
21. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 676, 679 (1979); Winans, 198 U.S. at 380–81.
22. Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 178–79 (2011).
23. Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 22, Salazar v. Patchak, 565 U.S. 1092 (2012)
(No. 11-247) (citation omitted); see also COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, MISPLACED
TRUST: THE BIA’S MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUND, H. REP . NO. 102-499, at 6
(1992) [hereinafter MISPLACED TRUST] (“The system of trusteeship . . . is deeply rooted in
Indian-US. history.”); Statement on Signing Executive Order on Consultation & Coordina-
tion with Indian Tribal Governments, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2487 (Nov. 6, 2000) (“Indian nations
and tribes ceded lands, water, and mineral rights in exchange for peace, security.”); Special
Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 564, 566 (July 8, 1970) (stating that
the United States’ Indian relationship “continues to carry immense . . . legal force”); AMERI-
CAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 11 (Comm. Print 1977), [hereinafter
AIPRC REPORT], http://www.docs.lakotalaw.org/NPR-report-sources/American%20Indian%
20Policy%20Review%20Commission,%20Final%20Report,%201977.pdf (noting same).  Ac-
cordingly, historic federal-tribal relations established “obligations to the fulfillment of which
the national honor has been committed.” Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 431
(1912).  “[T]he people as a whole benefit when the Executive Branch . . . protects Indian
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with the United States (i.e., contracts) that have not expired or been abro-
gated by Congress remain enforceable today.24  Moreover, Indians’ justifia-
ble expectations and legitimate reliance on those commitments, as well as
the long period of time during which the United States has benefited from
Indian land cessions, preclude any current assertion that the federal govern-
ment does not owe ongoing, enforceable fiduciary duties to Indians.25
Thus, at least in some circumstances, basic contract law principles apply to
federal-tribal relations.26
While contracts address relationships between parties, property law
governs the legal relations between people and “things,” which necessarily
includes certain “rights” and “interests.”27  Here, basic duties of reasonable
care are automatically established and applied when one holds property for
another.28  This relationship may come about without any formal agree-
ment, based upon parties’ relationships with each other and concerning the
relevant property, as a matter of bailment.29  In federal-Indian relations,
this may include restricted fee Indian lands or allotments.  While these situ-
ations concern real property and may be subject to specific laws or overrid-
ing constraints,30 the basic framework of holding onto property for another
remains.
property rights recognized in treaty commitments ratified[ ] by a coordinate branch.” Letter
from Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., to Cecil D. Andrus, Sec’y of the Interior (May 31, 1979),
https://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-021688.pdf.
24. Tsosie v. United States, 825 F.2d 393, 399–401 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
25. See City of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 215–17 (2005); United
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 201–02 (1926) (“[C]ourts can no more go behind [a
treaty] for the purpose of annulling it in whole or in part than they can go behind an act of
Congress . . . .  The propriety of this rule and the need for adhering to it are well illustrated
in the present case, where the assault on the treaty cession is made 70 years after the
treaty . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 639 (2005) (applying the Re-
statement of Contracts to federal Indian self-determination contracts); cf. United States v.
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (applying general principles of contract construction
and breach to contract action between private parties and the United States).
27. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP., ch. 1 Introductory Note (AM . LAW INST. 1999).
28. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 813 (2001).
29. Common examples of this include dry cleaning, valet parking, and airport baggage
handling. Id. at 811.
30. Compare United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003)
(finding federal trust duties for former military reservation held in trust for tribe subject to a
federal use right), with United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (finding
no enforceable federal trust duties imposed by General Allotment Act).
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The basic aspects of bailment lie on the boundary between contract and
property law,31 and date back to Armory v. Delamirie,32 the “Chimney
Sweep’s Jewel Case.”  In that case, a question of basic duty of care and a
corresponding presumption automatically arose.  This concept applies in
federal-Indian relations33 because “a fiduciary relationship necessarily
arises” “where the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervi-
sion over tribal monies or properties.”34  This is the case even when the
authorizing statute or document does not expressly impose a trust or fiduci-
ary connection.35  Still, not all duties in these situations are judicially
enforceable.36
It should not be surprising that the federal trust responsibility includes
and reflects basic elements of contract and property law.  Relations are nat-
urally a matter of contract law, and federal-Indian relations historically have
been established and shaped by agreements between the federal government
and Indian tribes.  Also, the federal trust responsibility naturally reflects
basic aspects of property law because American Indians can be distinguished
from others in the United States due to their aboriginal connections to real
property.  Combining these two points, the historical contracts that have
shaped federal-tribal relations have typically included provisions to protect
particular areas of real property for Indians.
B. Trust Law
Federal-Indian relations are not simply about contracts and property.
Rather, the “general trust” and “fiduciary trust” relations of the federal gov-
ernment regarding Indians and their property each involve “trust,” espe-
cially with the redundant emphasis in the latter, federally-defined term.37
As such, these relationships appropriately subject the trustee to certain fun-
31. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 811. R
32. Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (KB).
33. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation v. United States,
248 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying Armory).
34. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (quoting Navajo
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (1980)).
35. Id.; see also United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 292–95 (2009); White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 476–77.
36. See, e.g., Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
37. See DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, COMPREHENSIVE TRUST MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 n.1 (2003),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/commission/upload/14-2003-03-28-
Comprehensive-Trust-Mgmt-Plan.pdf (defining “fiduciary trust” as concerning trust asset
management, as distinguished from “general trust” which concerns appropriated program
funds); see also OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEP ’T OF JUSTICE POLICY ON INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH INDIAN TRIBES 4 (1995) (distinguishing be-
tween the “broader” and “narrower” senses of the federal trust responsibility to Indians).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA202.txt unknown Seq: 10 11-JUL-17 13:36
406 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 6:2
damental duties for the benefit of the trustor or beneficiary.38  The most
fundamental of these duties include administration,39 loyalty,40 care,41 and
impartiality,42 as well as the duty to keep and render accounts,43 furnish
information,44 and limit delegation.45  Also, while there are many types of
fiduciary relationships, one characteristic common to all is that a person in a
fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the
other as to matters within the scope of the relationship, including a duty
not to profit at the expense of the other.46  This is essentially the duty of
good faith, which means that trust duties include not only a duty of protec-
tion from others, but also a duty to protect the beneficiary from misconduct
by the trustee itself.  Trustees also must protect beneficiaries from malad-
ministration by beneficiaries themselves or others who may partly adminis-
ter a trust.47  Of course, how these trust duties should be implemented
varies over time and context.48
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (AM . LAW INST. 2007) (Definition of Trust).
39. See id. § 76 (Duty to Administer).
40. See id. § 78 (Duty of Loyalty).  This is often viewed as the most fundamental duty
owed by a trustee. Id.  It is the duty that binds the trustee to act in the best interests of the
beneficiary notwithstanding the trustee’s own interests. Id.
41. See id. § 77 (Duty of Prudence).
42. Id. § 79 (Duty of Impartiality).
43. See id. § 83 (Duty to Keep Records).
44. See id. §82 (Duty to Furnish Information).
45. Id. § 80 (Duty with Respect to Delegation).  Typically, a trustee owes a beneficiary
a duty to personally carryout the management of trust assets. Id.  However, there may be a
delegation under certain circumstances. Id.
46. Id. § 80 cmt. b.
47. Id. § 81 (Duty with Respect to Co-Trustees); Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (“Payment of funds at the request of a tribal council which, to the
knowledge of the Government officers charged with the administration of Indian affairs and
the disbursement of funds to satisfy treaty obligations, was composed of representatives
faithless to their own people and without integrity would be a clear breach of the Govern-
ment’s fiduciary obligation.”).
48. For example, under the general policy of regulating trade and intercourse with
Indian Tribes to treat them as nations, respect their rights, and afford protection, federal
regulation of Indian trading started in 1790 and has continued to the present. Warren Trad-
ing Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 688 (1965).  While earlier Indian
trader regulation focused on protecting Indians from exploitation by trading post monopo-
lies, see Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 570–71 (9th Cir. 1971), the federal government
more recently has proposed modernizing that implementation consistent with federal poli-
cies of tribal self-determination and self-governance. Traders with Indians, 81 Fed. Reg.
89,015 (Dec. 9, 2016).
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These basic fiduciary duties govern many federal-Indian relations, as
recognized by Congress49 and the Department of the Interior (DOI).50
This also is why courts look to common-law fiduciary principles to deter-
mine the scope of liability for Indians under federal statutes or regula-
tions.51  This corresponds to the recognition of fiduciaries and concerns
about conflicts of interests in other contexts, such as for management of
retirement investments under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).52
As the Solicitor for the DOI Leo Krulitz explained in 1978 letter to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), it is “beyond question” that the United States
has fiduciary responsibilities towards tribes.53  The trust responsibility is
also legally enforceable and imposes fiduciary standards on all executive
branch officials unless Congress acts contrary to Indians’ best interests,
though still subject to constitutional limits.54  That 1978 letter remains the
most comprehensive document available on this subject from the DOI.55  It
recognized—consistent with the basic common law of trusts—that “[t]he
government has fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, to make trust property
income productive, to enforce reasonable claims on behalf of Indians, and to
take affirmative action to preserve trust property.”56  That opinion remains
in effect today.57  It also has provided the basis for two Secretarial Orders
and the enumeration of basic federal trust responsibilities in the DOI Man-
49. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2015).
50. U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL pt. 303, § 2.7 (2000) [hereinafter
DOI MANUAL], https://bia.gov/cs/groups/mywcsp/documents/text/idc-022513.pdf.
51. Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 177 (2011).
52. See, e.g., Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule – Retirement
Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption; Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in
Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and
IRAs; Prohibited Transaction Exemptions, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Mar. 2, 2017) (addressing
the definition of who is a fiduciary under ERISA and the related rule on prohibited conflicts
of interest).
53. Letter from Leo Krulitz, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to James W. Moor-
man, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Nov. 21, 1978) [hereinafter Krulitz Letter].
54. Id. at 2.
55. U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, PRINCIPLES FOR THE DISCHARGE OF THE SECRETARY’S TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY, Order No. 3215, at 2 (Apr. 28, 2000) [hereinafter S.O. 3215].
56. Krulitz Letter, supra note 53, at 2.
57. U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, REAFFIRMATION OF THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO
FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES AND INDIVIDUAL INDIAN BENEFICIARIES, Order No. 3335, at
4 (Aug. 20, 2014) [hereinafter S.O. 3335]; see also Memorandum from Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, to Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, M-37045, at 1–2 (Jan. 18, 2017)
(noting same and reaffirming “longstanding federal Indian law principles concerning the
unique legal relationship between the United States and Indian tribes” and “these pro-
nouncements from Krulitz even as applied to the contemporary legal landscape”).
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ual.58  Each of those restated and elaborated on a number of common-law
fiduciary principles for the discharge of federal trust responsibilities regard-
ing Indian tribes, individual Indian beneficiaries, and Indian trust assets.59
More broadly, “[i]t is fairly clear that any Federal government action is
subject to the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities toward the Indian
tribes.”60  Therefore, agencies must exercise statutory duties “consistent
with their federal trust obligation.”61  Also, because “ ‘the federal trust re-
sponsibility imposes strict fiduciary standards on the conduct of executive
agencies,’ ” they must “take ‘all appropriate measures for protecting and
advancing’ . . . tribes’ interests.”62
Furthermore, the fiduciary nature of the federal trust responsibility to
Indians exists and applies regardless of how it has been mischaracterized
during the last 200 years.  In particular, “[f]iduciary relationships include
not only the relation of trustee and beneficiary but also, among others,
guardian-ward . . . relationships.”63  This is significant because the federal-
tribal relationship has been described sometimes as resembling a guardian-
ship.64  That characterization, while incorrect, does not reduce federal fidu-
ciary duties to Indian tribes.  Unlike true guardianships, Indian tribes do
not lack legal capacity and the United States holds title to most Indian
assets in trust.65  Also, the United States was not appointed to that position
by a court and its powers and duties are not merely fixed by statutes.66  In
58. S.O. 3215, supra note 55, at 2; S.O. 3335, supra note 57, at 2; see DOI MANUAL, supra
note 50, pt. 303, § 2.7. R
59. S.O. 3215, supra note 55, at 2; S.O. 3335, supra note 57, at 2; see DOI MANUAL, supra
note 50, pt. 303, § 2.7.
60. Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted); see also Hoopa
Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2005) (federal trust duties to Indian
tribes “extend to any federal government action”) (quoting Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990)).
61. Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1101 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing
Washington Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985)).
62. HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. B. (AM . LAW INST. 2007).
64. See, e.g., Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 177 (2011); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
65. See 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1934) (continuing periods of trust on Indian lands). Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 7, cmt. a (AM . LAW INST. 1959) (“A trustee . . . has title to
the trust property; a guardian of property does not . . . .”) (“[A] guardian is appointed only
when and for so long as the ward is lacking in legal capacity.”) (“A guardian is appointed by a
court . . . .”), with U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
66. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 7, cmt. b (“The powers and duties of a
guardian are fixed by statutes; the powers and duties of a trustee are determined by the terms
of the trust and by the rules stated in the Restatement . . . as they may be modified by
statute.”), with Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. at 177 (recognizing application of common-law in rela-
tion to statutes).
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addition, characterizing the federal-tribal relationship as a guardianship
does not preclude or limit application of enforceable fiduciary duties be-
cause “[t]he relation between [a] guardian and ward, like the relation be-
tween [a] trustee and [a] beneficiary, is a fiduciary relation.”67
Moreover, the principle that guardianships apply “only when and for so
long as the ward is lacking in legal capacity”68 supports tribal governmental
self-determination, a fundamental aspect of federal Indian policy.  Reten-
tion of sovereign, governmental jurisdiction was surely contemplated by
tribes when they entered into treaties with the United States.69  Also, fed-
eral support for Indian self-determination certainly lapsed during the assim-
ilation and termination periods.  However, recognizing that the federal trust
responsibility includes a duty to promote tribal self-determination, and the
lack of conflict between the trust responsibility and self-determination com-
ports with the original formulation of federal-tribal relations as well as cur-
rent Congressional and Executive policy for almost fifty years.
Most United States Presidents have made these two complementary
principles cornerstones of federal Indian policy since 1968.70  In addition,
almost every modern federal law concerning Indian tribes contains a state-
ment reaffirming the federal trust relationship to Indian tribes.71  In turn,
self-determination was the animating principle behind the Indian Self-De-
termination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, as well as subsequent
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 7, cmt. a.
68. Id.
69. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832); AIPRC REPORT, supra note 23, at R
6–7.
70. See, e.g., Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009);
Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments, 2
PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, § 2(b)
(Nov. 9, 2000) (recognizing self-determination as a fundamental principle in formulating
and implementing policies with tribal implications); Statement Reaffirming the Govern-
ment-to-Government Relationship Between the Federal Government and Tribal Govern-
ments, 1 PUB. PAPERS 662 (June 14, 1991); Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96, 96
(Jan. 24, 1983) (“In support of our [self-determination] policy, we shall continue to fulfill the
Federal trust responsibility for the physical and financial resources we hold in trust for the
tribes and their members.  The fulfillment of this unique responsibility will be accomplished
in accordance with the highest standards.”); Remarks at a Meeting with American Indian
Leaders, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2020 (July 16, 1976); Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs,
supra note 23, at 565–66 (advocating self-determination without termination as “[t]he first R
and most basic” goal of any new national policy toward Indians); Special Message to the
Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: “The Forgotten American,” 1 PUB. PA-
PERS 335, 337 (Mar. 6, 1968) [hereinafter The Forgotten American] (proposing self-
determination).
71. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(3)(a) (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2012] (citing examples).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA202.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-JUL-17 13:36
410 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 6:2
self-governance supplementation of that Act,72 and numerous additional
federal Indian policy enactments.73  Moreover, Congress has recognized
that there is no conflict between the federal trust responsibility and tribal
self-determination.  For example, Congress has specifically recognized that
“the United States has a trust responsibility to each tribal government that
includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government.”74
And just last year, Congress “reaffirm[ed] that the responsibility of the
United States to Indian tribes includes a duty to promote tribal self-deter-
mination regarding governmental authority and economic development.”75
Congress also has consistently preserved the trust relationship, even while
recognizing self-determination.76  Indeed, long-standing congressional In-
dian policy may well be described as nation-building.77  Prior criticisms of
the federal trust responsibility as paternalistic should be able to overcome
the historically racist interpretations and applications of the trust responsi-
bility, to recognize its evolution as a sovereign trust designed in part to
preserve and promote tribal sovereignty.78
Finally, the federal-Indian trust relationship fits into the broader field
of trust law and fiduciary relationships insofar as some breaches of the du-
ties are actionable, subject to limits imposed on claims against the United
States.  For this type of breach, the Supreme Court has affirmed money
damage awards against the United States for breach of fiduciary duties to
Indians in certain circumstances.  Examples include instances where the
federal government misappropriated tribal trust fund money,79 where the
72. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5302 (2015). See generally Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen
D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal-Self-Governance under the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM . INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2015).
73. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451 (financing)
(2015), 1601(2) (health care), 1802 (higher education), 1902 (child welfare), 2401 (employ-
ment), 2501(b) (schools), 2702(1) (gaming), 3104(a) (forests), 3502(a)(1) (energy resources),
3601(2)–(7) (justice), 3702(1), (4) (agriculture), 4101(7) (housing), 4301 (business
development).
74. Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601(2) (2015); see also id. §§ 2103(e) (2015)
(continuing obligations regarding Indian mineral development agreements), 4021 (providing
for withdrawal of tribal trust funds “consistent with the trust responsibilities of the United
States and the principles of self-determination”); Exec. Order 13,175, § 2 (recognizing both
as “Fundamental Principles”); Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 23, R
at 565–55.
75. 25 U.S.C. § 5602.
76. E.g., id. § 5329(c).
77. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM . INDIAN
L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2012-2013).
78. Cf. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 471 UTAH L. REV. 1472 (1994) (discussing these two sides of the trust
responsibility).
79. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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federal government allowed tribal trust assets to go to waste,80 and where
the federal government mismanaged tribal assets.81  But in other cases, the
Court has deferred to the United States Executive Branch and narrowly
construed federal laws to preclude money damages.  Most notably, this oc-
curred in the Navajo Nation’s $600 million claim that the Interior Depart-
ment improperly favored Peabody Coal Company over the Navajo Nation
in coal lease royalty adjustments and approvals.82  However, the fact that
“the Government has often structured the trust relationship to pursue its
own policy goals,”83 does not disprove the existence or enforceability of
fiduciary duties.  Instead, that confirms that those duties historically have
been disregarded by Congress or breached by the Executive Branch.84
In sum, regardless of how the federal trust responsibility might be char-
acterized, a key way in which federal-Indian relations differ from other rela-
tionships is that federal dealings with Indians should be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards.85  This idea should not be foreign to attorneys
because fiduciary obligations are a basic aspect of lawyer-client relation-
ships.86  Also, the federal-tribal trust relationship is appropriately enforcea-
ble and does not conflict with a duty to promote tribal self-determination.87
Contrary views misunderstand the nature of this relationship and basic ele-
ments of its legal character.88
80. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
81. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
82. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); see Kevin Gover, An Indian
Trust for the Twenty-first Century, 46 NAT. RES. J. 317, 352–56 (2006) (detailed case review and
critique); U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIAN TRUST ADMINISTRA-
TION AND REFORM 22 (2013) [hereinafter CITAR REPORT], https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/
files/migrated/cobell/commission/upload/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Indian-Trust-Ad-
ministration-and-Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf (“The [Navajo] decision has
been widely criticized and the narrow standard of liability employed by the Court should be
changed by Congress.”).
83. Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 175 (2011).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 378 (1980) (find-
ing Executive branch had abandoned “the Nation’s treaty obligation to preserve the integrity
of the Sioux territory.”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK 1941, supra note 4, at XI (noting that to the R
cynic, federal Indian legislation “may frequently appear as a mechanism for the orderly plun-
dering of the Indians”).
85. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 & n.12 (1942).
86. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7 (AM . BAR ASS’N,
2013) (setting out rules for competence, diligence, communications and conflicts of interest).
87. See Wood, supra note 78, at 1558 (“[W]hile the trust responsibility should support R
self-determination, that goal is illusory if it results from a compromised process or undue
federal manipulation . . . .”).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003).
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C. Foreign Relations
Related to their foundation in domestic trust law, federal-Indian rela-
tions and the federal trust responsibility also derive from and reflect the
international law of foreign relations because “ ‘dealings between the Fed-
eral Government and the Indian Tribes have regularly been handled as part
of our international relations.’ ”89  This should not be surprising because at
that time the Constitution was written, Indian Nations governed much of
the current United States, had shaped Anglo-,  Franco-, and Hispano-
American policies for centuries, and motivated and shaped the formation of
the United States.90  Also, early federal officials recognized that the law of
nations and customary international law governed federal relations with In-
dians.91  In particular, the relationship of Indian tribes with the United
States is founded on “the settled doctrine of the law of nations,” that when a
stronger sovereign assumes authority over a weaker sovereign, the stronger
assumes a duty of protection for the weaker, which does not surrender its
right to self-government.92  This derivation from general principles com-
mon to the major legal systems in the world is one of the fundamental
sources of international law.93
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the United States’ “duty of pro-
tection” to Indian tribes in Worcester v. Georgia.94  There, in describing the
1791 Treaty of Holston, the Court stated that “[t]his treaty, thus explicitly
recognizing the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self
government; thus guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and
of course pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; has
been frequently renewed, and is now in full force.”95  Similarly, many trea-
89. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 43 (1947)).
90. Gregory Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1003–05 (2014). See gen-
erally JAMES KELLY & BARBARA CLARK SMITH, JAMESTOWN, QUE´BEC, SANTA FE: THREE AMERICAN
BEGINNINGS (2007) (exploring the similarities and variances in European colonization and
interactions with indigenous populations).
91. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1060–61,
1072 (2015).
92. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 555 (1832); see also United States v. Candelaria,
271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926) (Congress “was but continuing the policy which prior governments
had deemed essential to the protection of such Indians.”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 384 (1886) (“From their very weakness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with
it the power.  This has always been recognized . . . .”). But see Pueblo of Jemez v. United
States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing the doctrine of Victoria and
aboriginal title).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(1)(c)
(AM . LAW INST. 1987).
94. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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ties between the United States and Indian tribes recognize that the tribes
are under the “protection” of the United States.96  Moreover, through stat-
utes, the United States has recognized that Indian tribes are distinct politi-
cal communities with territories that were “guarant[e]ed by the United
States.”97
The notion of one sovereign protecting another was not novel or unique
when it was first applied to Indian tribes by the Supreme Court in 1832,
when the federal trust responsibility in the United States was explicitly
founded on established international law.  Examples of this were common
then in Europe, where tributary and feudal states under the protection of
another state did not cause them to cease being sovereign and independent
states.98  The term for this “kind of international guardianship” where a
“vassal state” is represented internationally by another state is “suze-
rainty.”99  A suzerain is “a nation that exercises political control over an-
other nation in relation to which it is sovereign. . . .”100  As recognized in
Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations in 1758, and in Worcester in 1832, a state
which places itself under the protection of another without divesting itself
of the right of government does not, because of that, cease to be an inde-
pendent sovereign subject to the law of nations.101
Whether intentional or not, the shared sovereign territory between the
federal government and Indian tribes is somewhat like the shared sover-
eignty between the federal government and the states.102  The constituent
states of the United States also are subordinated in many ways to the fed-
eral government while retaining their sovereignty, though they ceased to
have international state status through adoption of the Constitution.  In
contrast, because Indian tribes were not parties to the Constitution, it
96. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 5, reporter’s notes at
59–61 (Tentative Draft No. 1) (on file with authors).
97. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.  Given that the early interactions between the United
States and Indian nations varied widely, it may be unfair to generalize the extent to which
the agreed protection of the United States was more “a guardian’s solicitude” or a “demand
for subordination. Cf. Ablavsky, supra note 91, at 1067; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557. R
98. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520.
99. Rob Dickinson, The Global Reach and Limitations of Self-Determination, 20 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 367, 375 n.46 (2012).
100. Kunani Nihipali, Stone by Stone, Bone by Bone: Rebuilding the Hawaiian Nation in the
Illusion of Reality, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 27, 42 (2002) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (6th ed.
1990)).
101. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 83 (Knud
Haakonssen ed., 2008).
102. See Ablavsky, supra note 91, at 1076 (“Native nations’ position within the United R
States was conceived similarly to federalism.  The restrictions imposed on tribal sovereignty
resembled state limitations under the Constitution.”).
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would be absurd to suggest that the adoption of the Constitution eliminated
Indian tribes’ sovereign status.103  Of course, tribes and states are dissimilar
in that the United States previously gained sovereign authority and a duty
of protection over Indian tribes through purchase, possession, and con-
quest,104 and even war with England.105  However, international law has
since evolved such that states (in the international sense) are obligated not
to recognize or accept the incorporation of a state into another state as a
result of conquest in violation of the United Nations Charter.106
For additional international context, another significant historical exam-
ple of suzerain relationships was the hundreds of indigenous princely states
recognized in India by the British imperial government.107  It was estimated
that there were between 562 and 693 princely states (i.e., likely more than
the number of currently federally recognized American Indian tribes), cov-
ering more than a third of India and encompassing about a quarter of the
population.108  Similar to Indian tribes in the United States, the Indian
princely states were protected by the imperial government, and “retained
significant control over internal affairs while being stripped of rights to
engage in foreign relations.”109  British rule was based on a political arrange-
ment founded on prior indigenous political forms, with dependent states
held by subordinate or tributary chieftains.110  These native political rela-
tions were congruent with the European understanding that sovereignty
could be held in degrees, rather than signifying a binary quality that a state
either categorically possessed or failed to retain.111  Unsurprisingly, interna-
tional lawyers and colonial officials in the nineteenth century embraced the
103. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210–11 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“The inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes has a historical basis that merits special
mention.  They governed territory on this continent long before Columbus arrived.  In con-
trast, most of the States were never actually independent sovereigns, and those that were
enjoyed that independent status for only a few years.”); Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“[I]t would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surren-
dered immunity in a convention to which they were not even parties.”).
104. Ablavsky, supra note 91, at 1072. R
105. Id. at 1078 (noting that the peace treaty for the War of 1812 “enshrined the princi-
ple that American Indian nations were lesser sovereigns solely under U.S. protection”).
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 202 cmt.
e (AM . LAW INST. 1987).
107. LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EM -
PIRES 1400-1900, 238 (2010).
108. Id.; Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 82 Fed. Reg. 4,915 (Jan. 17, 2017) (listing 567 federally
recognized Indian tribes).
109. BENTON, supra note 107, at 239.
110. Id. at 245.
111. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA202.txt unknown Seq: 19 11-JUL-17 13:36
Spring 2017] Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians 415
comparison between American Indian tribes and the Indian princely states
because the status of domestic dependent nations in the United States, in
their broadest outlines, resembled that of British paramountcy in India.112
Moreover, the international legal context for the federal trust responsi-
bility is not just a historic artifact.  A modern example of suzerainity can be
found in the European Union (EU).113  This includes the EU’s exercise of
“indirect power of its populations and requires the mediation of those vassal
states which acknowledge its dominium.”114  While the EU’s relationships
with its member states do not perfectly match the current federal-tribal
relationship, they nonetheless reflect “a de facto supremacy over the coun-
try”115 akin to the federal-tribal relationship.  Indeed, the concern about su-
zerainty is a large part of what motivated the debate in the United Kingdom
which culminated in a vote to exit the EU.116
Former and current United States territories also have had suzerain re-
lations with the United States’ federal government.117  Hawaii, Guam, and
Puerto Rico, through various agreements, relinquished their sovereignty to
the United States for territorial status.118  Similar to judicial application of
the doctrine of discovery for Indian tribes, the Supreme Court in the Insular
Cases “devised the doctrine of ‘territorial incorporation’ to help lay th[e]
‘imperial groundwork’” for federal authority over overseas territories.119
While one of these territories has become a state and others did not, all
those who inhabited or still live in these territories were or continue to be
112. Id. at 271–72.
113. See Alain Supiot, The Public-Private Relation in the Context of Today’s Refeudalization,
11 INT. J. CONST. L. 129, 141 (2013) (discussing same, as well as similar issues regarding the
International Monetary Fund).
114. Id.
115. See Nihipali, supra note 100, at 42 n.26 (first quoting CO M M. FOREIGN RELATIONS, R
MORGAN REPORT, S. REP . NO. 53-227 (1893) (discussing the annexation of Hawaii and its
relationship with the US); then quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (6th ed. 1990)).
116. See, e.g., Ivana Kottasova, Brexit Voters: Why I Want to Leave the EU, CNN MONEY
(June 20, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/20/news/brexit-eu-referendum-arguments/
(talking about British citizens’ concerns about democracy and national sovereignty); Alex
Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 (talking about how
sovereignty and democracy were reasons why people voted to leave); BBC NEWS, Q&A:
What Britain Wants from Europe (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
32695399 (talking about how David Cameron’s proposed objectives to reform UK’s relation
with EU include sovereignty).
117. See Gustavo Gelpi, The Insular Cases: A Comparative Historical Study of Puerto Rico,
Hawai’i and the Philippines, 58 FED. LAW. 22, 25 (2011).
118. See id. at 22.
119. Gelpi, supra note 117, at 22–23. R
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subject to an unequal application of laws, courts, and treatment.120  “Not
surprisingly, the Insular Cases have been, and continue to be, severely criti-
cized as being founded on racial and ethnic prejudices that violate the very
essence and foundation of our system of government” and as “a thoroughly
ossified set of cases marked by the intrinsically racist imperialism of a previ-
ous era of United States colonial expansion.”121
While the criticisms of the Insular Cases correspond to criticism of some
historic federal Indian case law and policy, the current prospects for extra-
territorial colonies may differ from those for Indian tribes, which have been
incorporated into existing states.122  For Puerto Rico, its citizens continue
to face the question of whether to maintain the status quo or pursue state-
hood or independence.123  For Indian tribes, the trust responsibility sup-
ports self-determination, as noted above.  Yet, it remains to be seen whether
that ultimately may result in more complete territorial sovereignty, as states
within or independent of the United States.
Just as federal-Indian relations and the federal trust relationship were
founded in part on international law over 200 years ago, the more recent
evolution of federal Indian policy parallels, and may be further informed by,
120. Id. at 24 (discussing electoral limits for Puerto Rico); see also Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“Abstaining from questions involving forward sovereignty and
territorial governance is one thing.  To hold the political branches have the power to switch
the Constitution on or off at will is quite another.”); Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475–76 (1979); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects and Surveyors v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 574 (1976); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309–11 (1922)
(comparing U.S. incorporation of Puerto Rico, Alaska, and the Philippines, and stating that
they were done “to secure them more certain protection against the world”); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282, 378–90 (1901) (“grave questions will arise from differences of
race, habits, laws and customs of the people”); United States v. Laboy Torres, 553 F.3d 715
(3d Cir. 2009); Leneuotti Fiafia Tuau v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2013)
(American Samoa); Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. United States, 670 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2009); Puerto Rico v. Northwest Selecta, Inc., 185 D.P.R. 40 (P.R.
2012) (dormant commerce clause applies to Puerto Rico); REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK
FORCE ON PUERTO RICO’S STATUS (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/uploads/Puerto_Rico_Task_Force_Report.pdf.
121. Ballentine v. United States, No. CIV-1999-130, 2001 WL 1242571, at *6–7 (D.V.I.
Oct. 15, 2001); Igartu´a v. United States of America, 626 F.3d 592, 612–13 (1st Cir. 2010)
(Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting among other things that
“changed conditions have long undermined the foundations of these judge-made rules, which
were established in a by-gone era in consonance with the distorted views of that epoch”).
122. But see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TULANE L. REV.
509, 555–56 (2007) (discussing possible original constitutional views regarding “internal” and
“external” Indian tribes).
123. See Puerto Rico’s New Governor Vows Push for Statehood, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/01/02/puerto-rico-new-governor-vows-
push-for-statehood/Rrw6B?NppYXsNFu1XREGkRP/story.html.
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the evolution of relevant international law.  Notably, the United Nations
was chartered with an express purpose of relations among nations based on
the self-determination of peoples.124  This included a recognition that
U.N.-member states with responsibilities for the administration of non-self-
governing territories—i.e., those whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government—have “as a sacred trust the obligation” “to de-
velop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free
political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each terri-
tory and its peoples and their varying states of advancement.”125  This par-
allels the domestic federal trust responsibility to support American Indian
tribal self-determination.
The U.N. Charter also established an international trusteeship system
for the administration and supervision of trust territories.126  This system
served
to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ment of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progres-
sive development towards self-government or independence as may
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship
agreement.127
Thus, the U.N. Charter expressly recognizes that trusteeship in interna-
tional law supports self-determination, unlike prior international and do-
mestic interpretations, which had applied it “to wean native peoples from
their ‘backward’ ways and to ‘civilize’ them.”128  Also, the U.N. Charter
recognizes that self-determination does not necessarily mean independence.
This provided for decolonization, but not necessarily complete indepen-
dence, even though the political theory that had supported colonialism had
long since been discredited.129  Moreover, decolonization per the U.N.
Charter applies only to geographically separate territories based on historic
colonial boundaries.  Therefore, the self-determination right that is recog-
124. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
125. Id. art. 73(b).
126. Id. arts. 75–85.
127. Id. art. 76(b).
128. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1996).
129. Id. at 43.
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nized in decolonization was an advancement, but it did not apply to indige-
nous groups within established countries.130
This basic, but limited, international right of self-determination has
been reaffirmed in subsequent international covenants.131  Through these
agreements, international law has affirmed “the fundamental importance of
the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.”132  However, until recently, international law did not
apply the principle of self-determination to indigenous peoples.
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Declaration).
While it has not been ratified by member states as a treaty, it does reflect
core principles that are widely accepted and therefore constitute customary
international law.133  The UN Declaration recognizes that indigenous peo-
ples have collective rights, including the right to self-determination, which
includes “the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to
their internal and local affairs.”134  Moreover, every international state has a
duty to provide effective mechanisms for prevention of and redress for any
action that has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, terri-
tories, or resources.135  Additional rights and obligations recognized in the
UN Declaration include the following, among many others:
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making
in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures . . . .
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indig-
enous peoples concerned through their own representative institu-
tions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.
. . . .
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development.
130. See id. at 43, 129.
131. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.1,
Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
132. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, pmbl.,
para. 16 (Sept. 13, 2007).
133. See ANAYA, supra note 128, at 56. R
134. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 132, arts. 1, 3, 4. R
135. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
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In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively in-
volved in developing and determining health, housing and other
economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as pos-
sible, to administer such programmes through their own
institutions.
. . . .
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can
include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equi-
table compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged
without their free, prior and informed consent.
. . . .
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt de-
cision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of con-
flicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to
effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and col-
lective rights.136
Through these provisions, the UN Declaration recognizes correspond-
ing indigenous rights and state duties of consultation, self-determination,
self-governance, and redress—all of which relate to the common-law of
trusts discussed here.  Still, the UN Declaration includes the material caveat
that nothing therein may be interpreted as implying any right to or author-
izing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair “the terri-
torial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.”137
Thus, unlike the long-established international trusteeship system or the
current political prospects for Puerto Rico, international law does not recog-
nize that the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples includes a
right to independence.  Also, the current international law of indigenous
rights has yet to be incorporated into United States law.
In 2010, the United States Department of State announced that the
United States supported the UN Declaration.138  While this was not a rati-
fication, it was still an important step.  This support also came with several
notable caveats.  First, the Department of State regarded the UN Declara-
136. Id. arts. 18, 19, 23, 28(1), 40; see also id. art. 32(2) (providing for state consultation,
good faith cooperation and free, prior, and informed consent for approval of projects affect-
ing indigenous lands, territories, or resources).
137. Id. art. 46(1).
138. U.S. DEP ’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLA-
RATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/
organization/184099.pdf.
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tion as only aspirational, notwithstanding its specific mandatory lan-
guage.139  Similarly, notwithstanding the language of the UN Declaration,
the Department of State asserted that the requirement for free, prior, and
informed consent only meant “meaningful consultation” with tribal leaders,
but not necessarily the concurrence of tribal leaders to federal government
actions.140  Finally, cognizant of the qualification in the UN Declaration
itself, the Department of State characterized the UN Declaration’s recogni-
tion of the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples to be “a new
and distinct international concept of self-determination specific to indige-
nous peoples . . . that is different from the existing right of self-determina-
tion in international law.”141  The Department of State thus recognized the
UN Declaration right of self-determination as consistent with existing fed-
eral policy to support, protect, and promote tribal governmental authority
over a broad range of internal and territorial affairs.142  More recently, the
DOJ has stated in its guidelines for working with Indian tribes that it “pro-
motes and pursues the objectives of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”143
The federal trust responsibility therefore may be on a path to coming
full circle in its relation to international law.  As was true at the beginning,
the federal trust responsibility may become re-domesticated from interna-
tional law, but qualified as before to not controvert “the actual state of
things” in the United States.144  Therefore, as with incorporation of com-
mon law principles from the law of trusts, this updated incorporation of
international law may be appropriate and helpful, though it may have lim-
ited impact in disrupting the status quo.145  Still, there is a sound basis for
this, especially for originalists, because the Founders originally intended for
all the branches of the federal government to use contemporary interna-
tional law as an interpretive framework in defining Indian rights in the
United States.146
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id.
143. Attorney General Guidelines Stating Principles for Working with Federally Recog-
nized Indian Tribes, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,905 (Dec. 12, 2014).
144. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832).
145. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 165–66 (2005).
146. Id. at 193–95.
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D. (Pre)Constitutional Law
Indian affairs were long-standing and significant issues at the time of
the constitutional convention, were inseparable from other critical constitu-
tional issues for the Framers, and ultimately elevated to constitutional sta-
tus.147  In Worcester v. Georgia, international law was “inextricably linked” to
the Constitution in Indian affairs.148  Also, as explained in United States v.
Lara, federal power to regulate Indian affairs—like other federal powers—
derives from the Constitution.149  Namely, the commerce and treaty clauses
have been recognized as the basis for the “plenary and exclusive” power of
Congress over Indian affairs.150  The Indian Commerce Clause in particular
“clearly . . . designated [Indians] by a distinct appellation” from foreign
Nations and states so that they were considered ‘entirely distinct.’ ”151  This
“clause is not limited to regulation of trade or economic activities, or laws
that are interstate in character or impact.”152 Instead, it provides to Con-
gress and divests the states of “virtually all authority over Indian commerce
and Indian tribes.”153  Especially following the end of treaty-making with
Indian tribes in 1871,154 the Indian Commerce Clause “has become the
linchpin in the more general power over Indian affairs” and is the most
often cited basis for modern legislation regarding Indians.”155  Thus, mod-
ern federal authority over Indian affairs, including the federal Indian trust
responsibility, typically reflects either direct constitutional authority by
Congress156 or authority delegated by Congress to the Executive Branch.157
It is no stretch to argue that core federalism principles embedded into
the Constitution derive directly from the Framers’ concerns about Indian
147. See Ablavsky, supra note 90, at 1004–08, 1080–85. R
148. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 36, 37
(1996).
149. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citing cases).
150. Id.; cf. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3 (Congress’ authority to create and admit new states
and administer territories).
151. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18 (1831).
152. COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2012, supra note 71, § 5.01(3) (citing United States v. R
Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Indian Commerce Clause
powers are “more extensive” than interstate commerce clause powers)).
153. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996)).
154. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R
155. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2012, supra note 71, § 5.01(3) (citing cases where the R
Indian Commerce Clause served as the basis for legislation ranging from gaming to cultural
preservation).
156. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004) (affirming Congress’s constitu-
tional power to relax restrictions on Indian tribes’ inherent legal authority).
157. See South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting nondelegation challenge to trust-land acquisition by the Department of the
Interior).
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affairs.  As Professor Ablavsky has noted, “[t]he most pressing issue for
early Americans was federalism: would the states or the national govern-
ment possess authority over Indian relations?”158  After the Revolution, the
vast western lands desired by the Americans were possessed by Indians, and
the states made conflicting claims to those lands that threatened to destroy
the nascent American republic.159  Ablavsky adds that “the background prin-
ciple that motivated federal constitutional supremacy over Indian affairs—
the concern that states’ attempts to assert jurisdiction over Native nations
were legally dubious and would lead to conflict—has been vindicated by
American history. . . .”160  In short, federal superintendency over American-
tribal relations dominated Indian affairs at the Founding.
Hence, federal power over Indian affairs and the federal trust responsi-
bility also predate and continue beyond the Constitution.  In the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the United States adopted the first important law on
Indian relations and established national policy towards Indians, two
months before the draft Constitution was presented and signed and two
years before it became effective.  The Northwest Ordinance declared the
following:
[t]he utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indi-
ans; their land and property shall never be taken from them with-
out their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they
never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done
to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.161
This assertion of preconstitutional federal power to legislate to protect In-
dian lands and interests became the guiding principle of federal Indian
law,162 which has expanded exponentially following adoption of the Consti-
tution.163  Also, this general authority of the federal government to legislate
regarding Indian affairs may constitute a “necessarily inherent” national
power that predates and survives the Constitution to the extent that it was
not “squeezed” into the Constitution.164  Therefore, to the extent that the
158. Ablavsky, supra note 91, at 1019. R
159. Id. at 1018–19.
160. Id. at 1052.
161. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. III (July 13, 1787).
162. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Cohen, supra note 89, at 45). R
163. See generally Title 25 U.S.C. §§ 1–5636 (2015).
164. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 384 (1886) (basing federal authority over Indians on the duty of protection that arose
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federal trust responsibility is not a principle of constitutional law, it is still a
surviving principle of preconstitutional law.
But while the power of Congress over Indian affairs may be plenary,
“‘this power to control and manage is not absolute.  While extending to all
appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it is subject to
limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional
restrictions.’”165  Consistent with the standard first set out in the Northwest
Ordinance, the government’s dealings with Indians must be judged by the
traditional rule that the trustee must act in good faith toward its beneficiary
based on relevant evidence, and not just the government’s simple asser-
tion.166  Moreover, while the Supreme Court previously presumed congres-
sional good faith based on the idea that Indian affairs were a political matter
not subject to judicial review, that view has long since been discredited.167
The “limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship” are of course the fed-
eral government’s duty of protection, essentially as an inherent limit on the
exercise of federal Indian affairs authority.  This corresponds to the “limita-
tions on the commerce power . . . inherent in the very language of the
Commerce Clause,”168 and the inherent “presupposition of our constitu-
tional structure,” under the Eleventh Amendment.169  This understanding
of the federal trust responsibility corresponds to protection of state sover-
eignty based on the Constitution’s “history and structure” beyond any spe-
cific provision.170  Here, courts must consider “whether a particular measure
from the assertion of that authority); Fletcher, supra note 122, at 544, 554–55; see Ablavsky, R
supra note 91, at 1082 (stating that the Supreme Court has “dragged in the Indian Commerce R
Clause post hoc to sanitize” the plenary power doctrine to avoid unenumerated powers and
the racist basis of Kagama).
165. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 103, 109–10 (1935)) (and citing additional cases) (cita-
tions omitted); see also United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946)
(“The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not
absolute.”).
166. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 416–17.  Because Sioux Nation was a congressional refer-
ence case concerning congressional action, it is one of the few modern cases to apply the
“general” trust responsibility outside the limits of the Indian Tucker Act or the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Id.
167. Id. at 413 (citing Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977)).
168. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995); see United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 608 n.3 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57).
169. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); see Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting same). See generally Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited . . .
and those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten”).
170. Ablavsky, supra note 91, at 1085–86, 1086 n. 397 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. R
706, 714 (1999); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–92 (2013) (questioning the
Defense of Marriage Act for departing from the constitutional “history and tradition of
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was appropriate for protecting and advancing the tribes’ interests” and prop-
erly “taken in pursuance of Congress’s power to manage and control tribal
lands for the Indians’ welfare” via “a thoroughgoing and impartial examina-
tion of the historical record.”171
As Felix Cohen explained, “the theory of American law governing In-
dian affairs has always been that the Government owed a duty of protection
to the Indian in his relations with non-Indians” and “the entire body of
federal legislation on Indian affairs . . . . may be viewed in its entirety as the
concrete content of the abstract principle of federal protection of the In-
dian.”172  Under this paradigm, the federal trust responsibility constitutes a
foundational basis for, not merely a function of, congressional legislation
regarding Indians.  And it imposes constitutional limits on the exercise of
congressional Indian affairs authority, just as there are inherent limits in the
Interstate Commerce Clause.
As may be confusing to observers, the federal trust responsibility is also
a source of federal power at the same time it limits federal power.  The
American Law Institute’s ongoing project to develop a Restatement of the
Law on the Law of American Indians explicitly acknowledges that the gen-
eral trust relationship is a source of federal legislative authority.173  The
current draft Restatement notes:
The United States’ trust relationship with Indians and tribes autho-
rizes the federal government to provide services to Indians and
tribes.  Through the treaty process, and the federal government’s
acquisition of and control over Indian and tribal trust assets, the
United States agreed to provide Indians with access to governmen-
tal services, including without limitation education, housing, health
care, and the preservation of law and order.  Congress is fulfilling
reliance on state law to define marriage”)); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2623–24 (2013) (invalidating a portion of the Voting Rights Act for violating the “fundamen-
tal principle of equal sovereignty among the States) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012) (limiting
congressional power to condition grants to states under the Spending Clause because
“[o]therwise the two-government system established by the Framers would give way to a
system that vests power in one central government”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
906–12 (1997) (holding that, although “there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise
question,” the federal government may not “commandeer” state officials based on “historical
understanding and practice . . . the structure of the Constitution, and . . . the jurisprudence
of this Court”).
171. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 415–16.
172. COHEN’S HANDBOOK 1941, supra note 4, at XI, XIII R
173. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 7(d) cmt. d (Tentative
Draft No. 1) (on file with authors).
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what it perceives as a special obligation to protect Indian tribes and
their members.174
The fact that the federal trust responsibility is a source as well as a limit
for federal Indian authority reflects its multifaceted legal origins.  As ex-
plained above, rather than merely being sui generis, the federal trust respon-
sibility has roots in and ongoing ties to a number of other basic areas of
common law.  Identifying and explaining these connections helps to clarify
the federal trust responsibility.  Professor Philip Frickey once encouraged
the Supreme Court to take federal Indian law cases more seriously by argu-
ing that the constitutionally based relationship between Indian tribes and
the United States is central to understanding American public law.175  For
Professor Frickey, the Supreme Court lost its way in navigating how inter-
national law informs federal Indian law in order to seek “coherence” rather
than embrace the full character of this area of public law.176  Federal Indian
law is the body of law arising from the federal government’s trust responsi-
bility to Indian tribes and Indian people, not another messy area of law that
the Court should clean up.
III. ISSUES PREVENTING GREATER CLARITY OR RECOGNITION OF
THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
Providing a better understanding of the broader common-law founda-
tion for the federal trust responsibility raises the question of what has im-
peded understanding and better recognition of that principle in the current
era of self-determination.  Those issues are explored in this section.
A. Executive Liability Evasion
Notwithstanding the established law and policy of the federal trust re-
sponsibility in the self-determination era, and the many positive efforts by
Congress and presidents over the last five decades, the Executive Branch
has repeatedly sought to avoid, reduce, and repudiate the federal trust re-
sponsibility to Indians.  This has been done by misrepresenting relevant
facts and law in Indian trust litigation in an effort to limit federal liability.
As explained below, this is part of a broader effort to protect the public fisc
and prevail in litigation.  These efforts have sought systemic changes in law
to diminish recognized federal responsibilities and the corresponding en-
forceable rights of Indians.  This stems in part from a statutory designation
174. Id. § 4 cmt. e.
175. Frickey, supra note 8, at 381, 439–40. R
176. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 431, 435–36 (2005).
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that the DOJ controls litigation in which the United States is a party177 and
the DOJ’s denial of the clear existence of potential conflicts in representing
the United States in dealings with Indians.
In his seminal 1970 Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs,
President Nixon recognized that federal-Indian conflicts present a key prob-
lem in federal Indian policy:
Every trustee has a legal obligation to advance the interests of the
beneficiaries of the trust without reservation and with the highest
degree of diligence and skill.  Under present conditions, it is often
difficult for the Department of the Interior and the Department of
Justice to fulfill this obligation.  No self-respecting law firm would
ever allow itself to represent two opposing clients in one dispute;
yet the Federal government has frequently found itself in precisely
that position.  There is considerable evidence that the Indians are
the losers when such situations arise.  More than that, the credibil-
ity of the Federal government is damaged whenever it appears that
such a conflict of interest exists.178
To correct this problem, President Nixon proposed to establish an In-
dian Trust Counsel Authority,179 and legislation to establish that office was
considered several times by Congress.180  However, that proposal was never
enacted despite the continuing need to find a viable means for resolving
these conflicts of interest, in part because of concerns that the Executive
Branch viewed the proposal as a means by which it “would simply be re-
lieved of any trust responsibility.”181  In the end, the Executive Branch
177. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2015).
178. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 23, at 573. R
179. Id. at 573–74; RICHARD NIXON, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. DOC. NO.
91-363, at 9–10 (1970).
180. See Indian Trust Counsel: Hearings on S. 2035 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on S.
2035]; Indian Trust Counsel Authority: Hearings on S. 1012 and S. 1339 Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., S. Hrg. Rep. 441-56
(1973); Creation of the Indian Trust Counsel Authority: Hearings on H.R. 6106, H.R. 6374, and
H.R. 6494 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
93rd Cong., H. Hrg. Rep. 441-11 (1973); Trust Counsel for Indian Affairs in the Dep’t of the
Interior: Hearing on S. 2451 to Establish in the Department of the Interior a Trust Counsel for
Indian Assets Before S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., S. Hrg. Rep. 101-1011
(1990) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 2451].
181. Hearing on S. 2451, supra note 180, at 10 (statement of Sen. McCain, Vice Chair- R
man, S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs); see Hearings on S. 2035, supra note 180, at 12 (letter R
from Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy Att’y Gen.); see also Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice:
The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1307, 1385–90 (2003).
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shared the goal “to ensure that every policy decision of [the Department of]
the Interior and other Federal agencies and bureaus with an impact on the
trust obligation of this Government has fully measured that decision in re-
spect to carrying out its trust obligation.”182  But the Executive Branch spe-
cifically opposed the legislation as “not . . . necessary to accomplish this
goal,” and instead explored “accomplishing and institutionalizing this goal”
within the DOI.183  Thus, the Indian Trust Counsel Authority remains the
only proposal in Nixon’s Special Message to Congress which has not been
enacted.184
Notably, the Executive Branch in the early 1970s sought to address this
concern pending legislation by filing in Indian trust litigation what became
known as “split briefs.”  This was done at the direction of the White House,
as reflected in two 1972 letters, one from the Attorney General to the White
House and another from the Solicitor General.185  Under this arrangement,
in cases involving a federal conflict of interest with Indians, the United
States would file a single brief in which DOI would function like an Indian
Trust Counsel by presenting arguments as a trustee in support of Indian
interests separate from arguments in the brief by DOJ against Indians.186
This was done six times, and each time, the DOI position prevailed over
DOJ’s position.187  In Critzer, the court even noted the government’s “com-
182. Hearing on S. 2451, supra note 180, at 11. R
183. Id. at 12, 65 (testimony and statement of Eddie Brown, Assistant Sec’y for Indian
Affairs).
184. Compare Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 23, at 567–74 R
(proposing rejection of termination, tribal right to control and operate federal programs,
restoring Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo, Indian education self-determination, Indian economic
development, Indian health funding, helping urban Indians, an Indian Trust Counsel Au-
thority, and an Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs), with 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2015)
(general and education self-determination), 5361–5368 (self-governance), 1451–1546 (eco-
nomic development), 1601–1685 (health care including for urban Indians), 2000–2026 (edu-
cation), 2401–2455 (alcohol and substance abuse treatment including for urban Indians), and
43 U.S.C. § 1453a (2015) (additional Assistant Secretary), and Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L.
91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970) (Blue Lake restoration).
185. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, TASK FORCE NO. 9, LAW
CONSOLIDATION, REVISION, AND CODIFICATION 6–7, App. II at 180–81 (1976), reproduced at
Hearing on S. 2451, supra note 180, at 52, 54–59 (describing arrangement and reproducing the R
text of those letters); see also Reid Peyton Chambers, Implementing the Federal Trust Responsi-
bility at the Interior Department After President Nixon’s 1970 Message to Congress on Indian Affairs
Supporting Tribal Self-Determination, 53 TULSA L. REV (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6–7)
(on file with authors).
186. Hearing on S. 2451, supra note 180, at 10 (statement of Sen. McCain). R
187. See Federal Government’s Relationship with American Indians: Hearings Before the S.
Spec. Comm. on Investigations of the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., S. Hrg. Rep.,
at 41–43, 50, 53, 66–67, 458–60 (1989) (discussing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollow-
breast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976); United States v. Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.
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mendable forthrightness” in including the statement by DOI which made
clear that “the government was in dispute with itself.”188 DOJ viewed that
as a criticism and used that a basis to seek to be relieved of split-briefing in
1976, which DOI and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)
opposed.189  This DOI/DOJ division even arose in cases where split-brief-
ing did not take place, with DOI reminding DOJ that “Congress has re-
posed principle authority for ‘the management of all Indian affairs and of
all matters arising out of Indian relations’ with DOI and expressing “serious
reservations” about a proposed statement by DOJ in litigation on the nature
of the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.190
Finally, in 1979, Attorney General Griffin Bell ended this practice, so that
there would be “a single position of the United States” in Indian trust
litigation.191
Since then, the DOJ has continued to assert that it has no conflict of
interest in addressing federal trust responsibility matters because it only
represents the United States.192  This issue of federal-Indian conflicts has
reached the Supreme Court several times, with the Supreme Court siding
with the DOJ in each instance.193  Also, in 2007, the DOJ and DOI joined
with the White House Office of Management and Budget to urge that Con-
gress enact “trust reform” legislation to implement an “Indian-owner man-
aged trust relationship” that would relieve the government of trust
obligations and close loopholes tightly to prevent potential future misman-
1976); United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974); Stevens v. Comm’r, 452 F.2d
741 (9th Cir. 1972); Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander,
440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Ore. 1977)); Hearing on S.2451, supra note 180, at 18–20, 56–60 (testi- R
mony of Reid Chambers and correspondence documenting the split brief practice including
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974), as an example).
188. Critzer, 498 F.2d at 1160–61.
189. Hearing on S. 2451, supra note 180, at 59–63 (reproducing text of correspondence, R
including DOI comment that the Administrative Conference of the United States had recog-
nized the problems caused by this conflict of interest).
190. Krulitz Letter, supra note 53, at 1 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2). R
191. Letter from Griffin B. Bell to Cecil D. Andrus, supra note 23; see also Michael J. R
Berrigan, Assoc. Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior, Navigating the Ethical Landscape in Pursuit of Federal Justice: Azimuths, and
Back-Azimuths, Presentation at 37th Annual Fed. Bar Ass’n Indian Law Conference, April
20, 2012, at 316 (discussing the unitary executive theory).
192. See, e.g., Juliano, supra note 181, at 1326 & n.124; David I. Gold, I Know You’re the R
Government’s Lawyer, But Are You My Lawyer Too? An Exploration of the Federal-Native Ameri-
can Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest, 19 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2000-2001); G. Wil-
liam Rice, Federal Trust Responsibility and Conflicts of Interest: Environmental Protection
or Natural Resource Development?, Panel discussion at North Dakota Law Review Sympo-
sium Conference, in 71 N.D. L. REV. 365, 378 (1995).
193. See, e.g., Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162 (2016); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
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agement claims and preclude future government exposure to liability for
any residual responsibilities.194  That proposal sought to address the struc-
tural problems that gave rise to significant Indian trust mismanagement
claims by eliminating federal responsibility and liability, rather than im-
proving the quality of federal management.195  Not surprisingly, Indian ad-
vocates characterized the proposal as repudiating or terminating the federal
trust responsibility196 and it was not enacted.197  Instead, the Claims Reso-
lution Act of 2010 was enacted, which only settled individual Indian trust
mismanagement claims and provided funding to reduce fractionation of in-
dividual Indian trust land ownership.198
More recently, the DOI has reaffirmed that it has an obligation to
“[w]ork with Indian tribes and individual Indian beneficiaries to avoid or
resolve conflicts to the maximum extent possible in a manner that accom-
modates and protects trust and restricted fee lands, trust resources, and
treaty and similarly recognized rights.”199  Meanwhile, the DOJ’s published
guidelines for working with Indian tribes only states that the DOJ honors
and strives to act in accordance with the general trust relationship between
the United States and Indian tribes, while the DOJ will handle litigation
involving tribes only “in a manner that is mindful of the government-to-
government relationship.”200  Thus, even the most recent official public
pronouncements, the DOI and DOJ illustrate differing views regarding the
federal trust responsibility. Also the long history of federal efforts and pol-
icy statements regarding fulfillment of the federal trust responsibility belies
the denial of those duties by the department charged with defending the
United States.
This important problem recognized by President Nixon that has not
gone away is evidence of a broader problem.  The Executive Branch some-
194. Indian Trust Fund Litigation: Hearing on Oversight Hearing on Indian Trust Fund Liti-
gation Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong., S. Hrg. Rep. 110-71, at 176–78
(2007) [hereinafter Indian Trust Fund Litigation: Hearing on Oversight] (letter & enclosures
from Dirk Kempthorne, Sec’y of the Interior, and Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to Hon.
Byron Dorgan, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (Mar. 1, 2007)).
195. Id. at 174.
196. Id. at 27, 28, 38.
197. S. REP . NO. 114-207, at 4–5 (2016) (reviewing Indian trust reform legislation in
previous Congresses).
198. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-291, § 101, 124 Stat. 3064, 3066 (2010).
199. S.O. NO. 3335, supra note 57, § 5, princ. 5. R
200. Attorney General Guidelines Stating Principles for Working with Federally Recog-
nized Indian Tribes, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,905 (Dec. 12, 2014); cf. Memorandum from Janet Reno,
Att’y Gen., on Dep’t of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-Govern-
ment Relations with Indian Tribes § III.D. (June 1, 1995), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
ag/attorney-general-june-1-1995-memorandum-indian-sovereignty (“The trust responsibility,
in both sense, will guide the Department in litigation . . . affecting Indian country.”).
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times has difficulty in providing justice for those who assert claims against
the United States, especially in the Court of Federal Claims, where signifi-
cant monetary claims against the federal government must be brought.201
This is the basic issue expressed in the epigraph here.  This broader prob-
lem also has been well-summarized by the then-Chief Judge of the Court of
Federal Claims concerning the Winstar savings and loan cases,202 which re-
sulted in multi-million dollar damage awards against the United States:
[b]ecause the dollars at stake appear to be so large the government
has raised legal and factual arguments that have little or no basis in
law, fact or logic.  While the court can appreciate the concerns of
the government’s attorneys to protect the public treasury, . . . it
must severely criticize the tactics and approach of the
government . . . .203
This issue also has arisen in other cases, including spent nuclear fuel cases
where the United States has faced numerous plaintiffs asserting very large
damage claims.204
Moreover, it has been documented and the DOJ has sometimes admit-
ted, through what are called “confessions of error,” that it has made misrep-
resentations in the Supreme Court.205  This is especially significant because
201. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1346 (2015).
202. United States v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839, 932–34 (1996).
203. California Fed. Bank v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 753, 754–55 (Fed. Cl. 1997),
rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Suess v. United States, 535 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
also S. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 598, 641–42 (Fed. Cl. 2003)
(awarding over $65 million in damages to institutional plaintiffs, concluding that the Court
was “dismayed at the Government’s tactics in the liability phase . . . despite a clear finding of
breach and obvious harm” and “Defendant continued to ignore the clear precedents of earlier
Winstar-related damages cases”), affirmed regarding institutional damage award and reversed and
vacated on other grounds, 422 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
204. See, e.g., Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1355–57
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming federal attorney sanction for misquoted judicial opinions in brief
to conceal adverse authority, “which intentionally or negligently misled the court”); Entergy
Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 739, 743–46, 744 n.4 (Fed. Cl. 2010)
(rejecting effort “to circumvent the very clear directive” of a mandamus order, finding,
among other things, that “the Government quotes this [relevant] text but carefully omits the
patently relevant portion . . . . To note that the Court is highly dismayed with Defendant’s
brief in this regard is an understatement.  It flatly will not countenance any such misbehavior
in the future.”).
205. See Allen Pusey, A State Secrets Doctrine is Born, A.B.A. J., March 2015, at 72 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court adoption of state secrets doctrine in United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1 (1953), a wrongful death action based on federal assertion that disclosure of files
would hamper national security, noting that declassification of those files 43 years later did
not reveal state secrets, and suggesting that “the very case that produced the doctrine reveals
its potential for abuse”); Neal Katyal, Confessions of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes
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“[w]hen the Solicitor General of the United States makes a representation
to the Supreme Court, trustworthiness is presumed.”206  In Indian law
cases, these errors included a much later confession that the government
had employed gross stereotypes to disparage the intelligence and compe-
tency of Indians reflecting prejudices to justify federal jurisdiction, in argu-
ments that unfortunately were adopted by the Supreme Court.207  In a
more recent case, the DOJ made “disturbing” arguments which were
adopted by the Supreme Court—that original Indian land title was not a
compensable property interest under the Fifth Amendment because Indians
were warlike, heathens, infidels, and savages that had been conquered.208
These problems affect the fulfillment of the federal trust responsibility
because the DOJ repeatedly has sought to avoid liability in Indian trust
litigation via misrepresentations.  For example, a number of federal courts
have either imposed sanctions for or strongly rejected unfounded federal
assertions in Indian breach of trust cases.209  Among these cases, three ex-
During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, JUSTICE BLOGS (May 20, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-
american-internment-cases (admitting failure to disclose key intelligence report that under-
mined rationale in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
206. Nat’l Immigration Project of the Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 842 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (concerning unsupported representation by
DOJ that was expressly relied on by the Supreme Court in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418
(2009)); Nat’l Immigration Project of the Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Security, 868 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that the representation was
in need of correction and that DOJ acknowledged this to the Supreme Court in a letter three
years after it had decided the case).
207. Neal Katyal, Acting Solicitor Gen., Speech of Acting Solicitor Gen. Neal Katyal,
3–6 (Apr. 8, 2011) (concerning United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)), in Stipulation
of Dismissal with Prejudice, California Indian Law Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 15-
00539 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2015), Exhibit 1, http://www.calindianlaw.org/uploads/2/8/4/5/
28458371/neal_katyal_osg_speech_transcript.pdf.
208. Id. at 6–8 (concerning Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955)).
209. See, e.g., Quapaw Tribe v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 673, 676–77 (Fed. Cl. 2015)
(“The Court will not employ a twisted interpretation of the 1833 Treaty to allow the Gov-
ernment to escape a promise it so clearly made. . . . Reading the Treaty as the Quapaw Tribe
would read it (or indeed as any reasonable person would read it), the Government has
breached its promise to make annual educational payments, and should be held accounta-
ble . . . . A 2011 case in this Court involving nearly identical facts is dispositive of Defen-
dant’s position . . . . Defendant’s counsel in [that case] was the same as in this case, yet
Defendant did not even disclose or discuss [that case] in its brief to the Court.”); Colorado
River Indian Tribes v. United States, No. 06-901L, slip op. at 7 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 3, 2015)
(“Although defendant’s argument has been rejected numerous times in the past, as discussed
below, defendant, once again in this case, asserts that this court is divested of jurisdiction
upon filing of a complaint in a District Court ‘regardless of the filing sequence of Plaintiff’s
district court case and this case.’ ”); Osage Tribe v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 1, 6–7 (Fed.
Cl. 2010) (rejecting assertion that the United States is not bound by prior rulings in case on
breach of trust duties, noting that “[t]he court is dismayed by defendant’s approach to the
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amples warrant further discussion.  First, the Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts have repeatedly rejected Executive Branch arguments that
there is essentially no enforceable federal-tribal fiduciary relationship be-
cause the United States is not subject to any duty that is not expressly
stated in statutes or regulations.210  Notwithstanding those numerous deci-
sions, the Executive Branch has continued to assert this argument.
This argument was most recently rejected by the Court of Federal
Claims in Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, on remand from the Su-
preme Court,211 and warrants restatement:
[The United States] would have this court blithely accept what so
many courts have rejected—that for the breach of a fiduciary duty
to be actionable in this court, that duty must be spelled out, in no
uncertain terms, in a statute or regulation.  But to conclude this,
this court would have to perform a logic-defying feat of legal
gymnastics.
resolution of plaintiff’s claims”); Osage Tribe v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 462, 468–69,
480–81 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (rejecting argument previously rejected six times by the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit, noting that “Defendant’s argument would . . . ‘reward the
government for inaction that violates the government’s fiduciary duties to collect funds and
accrue interest’ ”); Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States (Jicarilla II), 60 Fed. Cl. 611,
613–14 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (rejecting opposition to disclosure of tribes’ own information);
Pueblo of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 135–37 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (“[c]ontrary to
defendant’s importunings, this court plainly has the authority to issue such orders” to require
preservation of relevant evidence).; Mescal v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 450, 454–55
(D.N.M. 1997) (sanctioning federal attorney sua sponte for factual misrepresentations);
Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 176,
192–93 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (“Such an assertion [by the United States], we find, is shocking,
insofar as it is a gross misstatement of the law.”); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck
Reservation v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 158, 164–66 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (imposing sanction for
federal factual misrepresentation).
210. See, e.g., Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 177 (2011) (“We have looked to common-law
principles to inform our interpretation of statutes and to determine the scope of liability that
Congress has imposed.”); United States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. 465, 476–77
(2003) (affirming trust duty even though there was not a word in the only relevant law that
suggested such a mandate); Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.2d 461, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (under
White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 476–77, “[o]nce a statutory obligation is identified, the
court may look to common law trust principles to particularize that obligation”); Cobell v.
Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1100–01 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per Mitchell II, “[t]he general ‘contours’
of the government’s obligations may be defined by statute, but the interstices must be filled
in through reference to general trust law”); Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 42–43
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (rejecting that “a federal trust must spell out specifically all the trust duties of
the Government”); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 988 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (“Nor is
the court required to find all the fiduciary obligations it may enforce within the express
terms of an authorizing statute . . . .”).
211. Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. at 162.
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That routine would commence with a full jurisprudential
gainer—a twisting, backwards maneuver that would allow the court
to ignore cases like White Mountain Apache and Mitchell II that have
relied upon the common law to map the scope of enforceable fidu-
ciary duties established by statutes and regulations.  The court
would then need to vault over Cheyenne-Arapaho and a soaring pyr-
amid of other precedents, all of which have found defendant’s argu-
ment wanting.  Next, the court would be called upon to handspring
to the conclusion that Congress’ repeated legislative efforts to en-
sure the safe investment of tribal funds were mostly for naught—
because, if defendant is correct, the provisions enacted were gener-
ally not perspicuous enough to create enforceable duties and, even
where specific enough to do so, left interstices in which defendant
could range freely.  Indeed, while egging the court on, defendant
never quite comes to grip with the fact that if the government’s
fiduciary duties are limited to the plain dictates of the statutes
themselves, such duties are not really “fiduciary” duties at all. See
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 . . . (1996) (“[i]f the fiduci-
ary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled
by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose”).  Taken
to its logical dismount, defendant’s view of the controlling statutes
would not only defeat the twin claims at issue, but virtually all the
investment claims found in the tribal trust cases, few of which in-
voke haec verba specific language in a statute or regulation.  Were
the court convinced even to attempt this tumbling run, it almost
certainly would end up flat on its back and thereby garner from the
three judges reviewing its efforts a combined score of “zero”—not
coincidentally, precisely the number of decisions that have adopted
defendant’s position.
This court will not be the first to blunder down this path.212
Notwithstanding that strongly worded decision and the “phalanx of . . .
precedent” on which it is based213 the Executive Branch has continued to
assert that its trust duties to Indians are limited to express statutory or
regulatory mandates.214
212. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States (Jicarilla VIII), 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 738 (Fed.
Cl. 2011).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to De-
fendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5, Sissteon Wahpeton Oyate v. Jewell, No. 13-00601 (D.D.C.
Sept. 17, 2015); U.S.’s Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Concessions of Law (Phase
1 Trial) at 3, Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, No. 02-025 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 28, 2011),
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Similar issues apply to the Executive Branch’s assertion that its man-
agement of Indian trust assets should be subject to an arbitrary and capri-
cious administrative standard of review, rather than a strict fiduciary
standard of care, contrary to fifteen decisions by the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.215  This problem also has existed in tribal contract sup-
port claim cases. There:
[r]ather than acting quickly to resolve these claims, which are sup-
ported by years of data documenting the government’s underpay-
ments, the agencies insisted that in order to settle these claims they
must re-audit contracts and re-calculate indirect cost rates accord-
ing to retroactively adopted accounting rules in an effort to re-de-
termine the amount of underpayments.  The result has largely been
to further delay justice and further burden tribes with slow, expen-
sive and unnecessary accounting battles . . . .216
Next, notwithstanding a heightened duty of candor because of the “spe-
cial credence” that the Supreme Court gives to the Solicitor General,217 the
DOJ has been neither candid with the Supreme Court nor consistent with
prior DOI policy in either of two recent Supreme Court Indian trust re-
sponsibility cases.  In United States v. Navajo Nation,218 the Supreme Court
held that neither the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) nor its regula-
tions established enforceable fiduciary duties that precluded the Secretary
of the Interior from secretly colluding with a mining company to force ex-
tended unsupervised tribal lease negotiations under severe economic pres-
sure, not disclosing material support for a higher royalty, and then
approving the resulting lease amendments without assessing their merits.219
ECF No. 350; United States’ Post-Trial Brief, Proposed Findings of Fact, and Proposed
Conclusions of Law at 55 n.1, Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, No. 02-025 (Fed. Cl.
Jan. 23, 2012), ECF No. 380.
215. See Jicarilla VIII, 100 Fed. Cl. at 739 (quoting, citing, and discussing prior deci-
sions); Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States (Jicarilla III), 88 Fed. Cl. 1, 20 & n.28 (Fed.
Cl. 2009) (noting “it is often observed that the duty of care owed by the United States ‘is
not mere reasonableness, but the highest fiduciary standards’ ”) (citation omitted), mandamus
denied on other ground sub. nom, In re United States, Misc. No. 09-908, 2011 WL 7447331
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 3, 2011); see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)
(the Government’s conduct in dealings with Indians “should therefore be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards.”).
216. Indian Country Priorities for the 114th Congress: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 114th Cong. 19 (2015) (statement of Hon. Brian Cladoosby, President, National Con-
gress of American Indians).
217. See generally Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 602 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1987)
(discussing Korematsu misrepresentation).
218. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
219. Id.
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In that decision, the Supreme Court emphasized a distinction under the
IMLA between oil and gas versus coal leasing,220 that the IMLA aimed to
enhance tribal self-determination by giving Indian tribes the lead role in
negotiating mining leases,221 and that it was not until later that a regulation
first required consideration of Indians’ best interests in administrative
decisions.222
As in other cases, the Supreme Court’s decision relied on notable repre-
sentations by the Executive Branch.  Here, the Executive Branch did not
admit that during the relevant period the governing regulations provided
the following:
[n]o oil and gas lease shall be approved unless it has first been
offered at an advertised sale in accordance with [25 C.F.R.]
§ 211.3.  Leases for minerals other than oil and gas shall be adver-
tised for bids as prescribed in § 211.3 unless the Commissioner [of
Indian Affairs] grants to the Indian owners written permission to
negotiate for a lease.  Negotiated leases, accompanied by proper
bond and other supporting papers, shall be filed with the Superin-
tendent of the appropriate Indian Agency within 30 days after such
permission shall have been granted by the Commissioner to negoti-
ate the lease.  The appropriate Area Director is authorized in
proper cases to grant a reasonable extension of this period prior to
its expiration.  The right is reserved to the Secretary of the Interior
to direct that negotiated leases be rejected and that they be adver-
tised for bids.223
Thus, the governing regulations only treated coal leasing differently by al-
lowing limited negotiations subject to strict federal oversight and super-
vening control, which the Executive Branch failed to provide.  Moreover,
the Executive Branch did not acknowledge before the Supreme Court that
the subsequent regulation requiring consideration of Indians’ best interests
in all federal actions under the IMLA, 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, merely “settle[d]
the issue of whether the Secretary is limited to technical functions or con-
siderations,” to be “consistent with the United States’ trust responsibility as
defined by statute.”224  The Executive Branch also failed to acknowledge
that in the lower court, it had expressly conceded that the IMLA required it
220. Id. at 495–96.
221. Id. at 508.
222. Id. at 508 n.12.
223. 25 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1958-1996).
224. Assignment of Agency Component for Review of Premarket Applications, 56 Fed.
Reg. 58,734, 58,735 (proposed Nov. 21, 1991).
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to “take the Indians’ best interest into account when making any decision
involving [mineral] leases on tribal lands,”225 and that the later regulation
merely codified the preexisting statutory requirement.226
More recently, in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Supreme
Court ruled that the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege
does not apply to the federal-tribal trust relationship, including for tribal
trust fund management.227  As noted above, the Executive Branch there
asserted—in the face of numerous contrary authorities—that no common-
law fiduciary duties apply at all.228  In addition, the Executive Branch ar-
gued there that the United States does not represent tribal interests and
does not have duties of loyalty or disclosure in managing Indian trust as-
sets.229  It also asserted that the performance of federal trust administration
is essentially a gratuity not paid for by tribes, and that disclosure there
would cause ethics problems and chill critical legal advice.230  However, the
Executive Branch failed to acknowledge any of the foundational history and
principles discussed above.  It also failed to disclose that all Executive
Branch employees have a duty of “loyalty to the Constitution, laws and
ethical principles” as a “[b]asic obligation of public service,”231 that DOI
employees must “[c]omply with any lawful regulations, orders, or policies,”
and that failure to comply with such policies warrants disciplinary action
including removal.232  In particular, the DOI Manual prescribes those
mandatory policies233 and requires that employees “discharge . . . the Secre-
tary’s Indian trust responsibility with a high degree of skill, care, and loy-
alty,” “[c]ommunicate with beneficial owners regarding the management
and administration of Indian trust assets,” and “[a]ssure that any manage-
ment of Indian trust assets . . . promotes the interest of the beneficial
owner[s].”234
Moreover, the DOI Manual defines “Indian Fiduciary Trust Records”
as including all documents that are used in the management of Indian trust
225. Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1982).
226. See Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development and Leasing of Allotted
Lands for Mineral Development, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,634, 35,640 (July 8, 1996).
227. Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 187 (2011).
228. See generally Brief for United States, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564
U.S. 162 (2011) (No. 10-382).
229. See id. at 36–37.
230. Id. at 23–24.
231. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a) (1990).
232. 43 C.F.R. § 20.502 (1998).
233. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE pt. 011, ch. 1
(2001), http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/0/doc/456/Page1.aspx.
234. DOI MANUAL, supra note 50, pt. 303, § 2.7, 2.7(B), 2.7(L). R
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assets.235  Furthermore, the Secretarial Order that provided the basis for the
governing DOI Manual provisions (i.e., their regulatory history) recognized
that understanding the Department’s nonexhaustive trust responsibilities
includes looking to guidance in legal advice by the Solicitor’s Office.236
Thus, communication with Indian beneficiaries about trust asset manage-
ment logically included the disclosure of supporting legal advice, except
where federal and Indian interests diverge, and the United States is defend-
ing itself against Indian claims.237
In addition, the Executive Branch failed to acknowledge before the Su-
preme Court that its claims of potential harm from disclosure had “a some-
what hollow ring” because it had “simply complied” with several similar
prior disclosure orders over nine years.238  Indeed, the Executive Branch
previously had disclosed almost half the disputed documents at issue in that
case—some even in prior litigation several decades previously—all without
any identifiable ill effects.  Finally, the Executive Branch failed to disclose
that the attorney-client privilege “applies only where necessary to achieve
its purpose,”239 which “serves ‘broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice,’ ”240 and that disclosure there—like al-
lowing tribal damage claims—would “deter federal officials from violating
their trust duties.”241
All this illustrates the ongoing problems with the internal conflict that
President Nixon first recognized.  On one hand, Congress, the President,
and DOI have repeatedly recognized the existence of a meaningful fiduciary
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.  Moreover,
when federal and Indian interests are aligned, DOJ will strongly assert that
the federal trust responsibility applies to all federal actions.242  On the other
hand, the DOJ continues to have difficulty in honoring the federal trust
responsibility when Indians bring claims against the United States.  This is
especially challenging because Supreme Court jurisprudence on the federal
235. U.S. DEP ’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL pt. 303, ch. 6 (2003), https://
bia.gov/cs/groups/mywcsp/?documents/text/idc-022514.pdf; cf. DOI MANUAL, supra note 50, R
pt. 303, § 2.7(I).
236. S.O. 3215, supra note 55, at 2. R
237. See generally Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States (Jicarilla V), 91 Fed. Cl. 489
(Fed. Cl. 2010).
238. See id. at 494 & n.8.
239. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
240. Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009) (quoting Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
241. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 227 (1983).
242. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. R
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trust responsibility relies in large part on representations by the Executive
Branch.243
In sum, it appears that the Executive Branch’s response to rejection of
its trust repudiation legislation proposal has been to continue to proclaim
fealty to the trust responsibility as a moral platitude that can support fed-
eral action, while at the same time seeking to avoid that responsibility when
it might be used against the Executive.244  This approach impermissibly
ignores foundational American history and commitments, as well as Con-
gress’ express constitutional authority and repeated directives.  It also un-
dermines federal-tribal government-to-government relationships, as well as
federal and tribal positions that should be aligned in issues with third par-
ties.245  More broadly, a “system of law that places any value on finality—as
any system of law worth its salt must—cannot allow intransigent litigants to
challenge settled decisions year after year, decade after decade, until they
243. Cf. Modrall Sperling, Professor Kevin Washburn: Reflections on Service as Assistant
Secretary-Indian Affairs, the State of Indian Law in 2016, and Returning Home to New Mexico,
NATIVE AM . L. WATCH, Spring 2016, at 2, 5 (commenting on the role of recent Supreme
Court decisions on DOI’s trust mission), http://www.modrall.com/ Professor-Kevin-Wash-
burn-Reflections-on-Service-as-Assistant-Secretary-Indian-Affairs-the-State-of-Indian-Law-
in-2016-and-Returning-Home-to-New-Mexico.
244. Compare U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FISCAL YEAR 2012 INTERIOR BUDGET IN BRIEF DH-
66 (2011), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/budget/appropriations/2012/
highlights/upload/Strengthening-Tribal-Nations.pdf (quoting Secretary of the Interior: “In-
dian Country deserves responsive and responsible business practices from Interior that will
. . . comply with the obligations of a trustee.”), and News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery By Assistant Attorney General Ignacia Moreno on 2011
Priorities for the Environment and Natural Resources Division (Jan. 13, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-assistant-attorney-general-ignacia-
moreno-2011-priorities (“I could not be more committed to fulfilling the Division’s core
mission,” including “[c]areful and respectful management of the United States’ trust obliga-
tions to Native Americans”), with discussion supra notes 23, 194 and accompanying text (dis- R
cussing prior reports and oversight hearings and BIA’s failure to comply with congressional
directives), and Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the
White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec. 16, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference
(“What matters far more than words . . . are actions to match those words. . . .  That’s the
standard I expect my administration to be held to.”).
245. See, e.g., Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Timothy H. McLaughlin, United States v. Ji-
carilla Apache Nation: The Executive Branch’s Latest Effort to Repudiate Federal Trust Duties to
Indians, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Mar./Apr. 2011, at 48, 54 & n.8 (discussing proposed Indian
Trust Counsel Authority and successful split-briefing practice in the 1970s); CITAR RE-
PORT, supra note 82, at 23 (“The Commission acknowledges that the United States must
assert valid defenses to litigation brought by tribes and individual Indians, but the usual
zealous defense should be tempered and informed by the federal-tribal trust.”).
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wear everyone else out.”246  This is especially true “when those intransigent
litigants turn out to be public officials.”247  If the Executive Branch does not
take the federal trust responsibility seriously, why would anyone else?
This raises the important question of why the Executive has adopted
this posture.  It has been suggested elsewhere that this posture is caused by
the internal structure at the DOJ and its multiple obligations.248  Two other
issues also likely are at play.  First, by statute, the Attorney General shall
supervise and DOJ shall conduct all litigation to which the United States,
an agency, or officer thereof is a party, except as otherwise provided by
law.249  This reflects the unitary executive theory described above, so that
once a claim is in litigation, the DOJ has exclusive authority over that litiga-
tion for the Executive Branch. As this has been explained:
[t]here needs to be clarity and a bright-line rule on the Executive
Branch’s side who controls litigation and claims of money, and
Congress has sensibly made that delegation to the DOJ.  Where a
rogue [federal agency official] issues a decision after litigation has
commenced on a claim that undermines or contravenes the DOJ’s
litigation strategy or approach to the settlement process, that deci-
sion will be invalid . . . .250
In practice, this means that the “DOJ functions as DOI’s litigation
counsel but, unlike ordinary outside counsel, does not need to defer to
DOI’s wishes as a client.”251  This is notable because it essentially means
that the DOJ may assert a statutory basis for not complying with the Rules
of Professional Conduct.252  Thus, even when the DOI may want to honor
federal trust duties, the DOJ may oppose doing so.  This was what moti-
246. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah, 790 F.3d. 1000, 1012
(10th Cir. 2015) (concerning arguments by the State of Utah); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
F.B.I., 522 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Faced with the same argument for the third
time, we see no reason to reach a different result today.  Indeed, the government’s decision
to dust off a thoroughly discredited argument and present it to us anew wastes both our time
and the government’s resources.”).
247. Ute Indian Tribe, 790 F.3d at 1012.
248. Juliano, supra note 181, at 1307. R
249. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2015).
250. Navajo Health Found. v. Burwell, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1151 (D.N.M. 2015) (not-
ing that this limit does not preclude federal agencies from acting when “cooperating and
working in tandem” with the DOJ).
251. Venus Prince, Insights from In-House and Interior: Top 10 Lessons From My 10 Years of
Experience, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Apr. 2016, at 28, 31.
252. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM . BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A] lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”).
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vated the Indian Trust Counsel Authority proposal and was reflected in the
split-briefing practice.  More recently, this happened in Jicarilla, where the
DOJ’s post-hoc litigation defense asserted a “cramped view of [the United
States’] fiduciary obligations” compared to those reflected in the DOI Man-
ual, the still applicable Krulitz letter discussed above, and prior DOI memos
and opinions, including those that DOJ sought to shield from discovery.253
All this leads to what may be the larger underlying reason for DOJ’s
difficulty in acknowledging broader federal trust duties to Indians.  Given
that the DOJ’s efforts to avoid liability are not limited to Indian claims, it
appears that the DOJ has subordinated substantive legal support for the
federal trust responsibility to a supervening interest in protecting the public
fisc.  This has been made clear in a DOJ budget proposal while significant
tribal trust mismanagement litigation was pending.254  It is understandable
and laudable that the DOJ wants to protect taxpayer money from undue
253. Compare Jicarilla VIII, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 736 (Fed. Cl. 2011), and id. at 733, 734–39
& nn.10–18 (rejecting DOJ arguments that DOI is not subject to common law trust duties
beyond express statutory mandates regarding trust fund management, including duties to
maximize income, exercise independent judgment, and consider pooling trust funds for in-
vestment purposes, noting among other things that “there are a number of holes in this
argument” and that it had been repeatedly rejected by courts), and Jicarilla Apache Nation v.
United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 274, 287, 298–99, 298 n. 41, 299 n.43 (Fed. Cl. 2013) (reaffirm-
ing application of common law fiduciary duties after trial “[a]lthough defendant continues to
argue otherwise” including that DOI had a duty to exercise independent judgment and not
delegate, contrary to DOJ’s current claim that DOI was “nothing more than a glorified
‘order-taker,’ ” which was contradicted in part by 1966 and 1973 DOI memos); DOI MANUAL,
supra note 50 (listing trust duties), and supra notes 53–59 and text accompanying note 53 R
(discussing the Krulitz Letter and S.O.’s 3215 and 3335), and Memorandum from Thomas
W. Fredericks, Assoc. Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Deputy Asst. Sec’y–Indian Affairs (Pro-
gram Operations) (Jan. 24, 1978) (on file with authors) (applying private trustee standards
and finding tribal trust funds pooling appropriate “even in the absence of express statutory
authority”), and Memorandum from Tim Vollmann, Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs,
to Asst. Sec’y of Indian Affairs (Feb. 10, 1986) (on file with authors) (reaffirming same), and
Memorandum from Tim Vollmann, Acting Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs, to Asst.
Sec’y–Indian Affairs (July 21, 1983) (on file with authors) (emphasizing that the United
States must “exercise independent judgment” and “make maximum productive investment”
for Indian trust funds), and Memorandum from Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs, to
Deputy Asst. Sec’y of Indian Affairs (May 13, 1985) (on file with authors) (reaffirming
same), and Memorandum from William G. Lavell, Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs, to
Asst. Sec’y of Indian Affairs (March 21, 1990) (on file with authors) (relying on common-law
trust duties and reconfirming authorization for pooling), with Jicarilla III, 88 Fed. Cl. 1, 24,
25, 29, 30, 34 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (listing above memos as documents 13-16, 44, 96, 168, 189-191
in discovery privilege ruling).
254. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ENVT. & NAT. RES. DIV., FY2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CON-
GRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 2, 12, (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/
2014/01/29/fy13-enrd-justification.pdf (noting “Strategic Objective 2.6: Protect the federal
fisc”) (“The effectiveness of our defensive litigation” concerning tribal trust litigation is mea-
sured in part by “savings to the federal fisc.”).
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claims.  However, that goal should not override centuries of history, trea-
ties, and statutes, as well as almost a half-century of congressional, presi-
dential, and administrative policy, as well as copious governing case law.
B. Neocolonial Judicial Activism
Unfortunately, the institutional problems precluding greater recogni-
tion of the federal trust responsibility are not limited to the Executive
Branch.  Regardless of what the Executive Branch may assert, it could not
avoid the federal trust responsibility without a Supreme Court inclined to
rule against Indians and skeptical of the federal trust responsibility.  This
situation may exist in part because some on the Supreme Court do not seem
to understand the federal-Indian trust relationship255 or perhaps “do . . . not
care what happens in Indian Country.”256  Moreover, the Supreme Court
has not yet seemed to fully apprehend the original understanding of a ro-
bust federal trust responsibility incorporated into the Constitution from in-
ternational law and derived from the relevant common law of contracts,
property law, and trusts, as explained above.257  This situation also likely
derives in part from the fact that support of the Executive Branch is an
important condition of and often correlates with the success of Indians
before the Supreme Court, and trust responsibility disputes invariably pit
Indian interests against the Executive Branch.258
As has been explained elsewhere, there is a long, continuing tradition of
Supreme Court justices relying in Indian law cases on racial stereotypes
based on European colonial-era doctrines of white racial superiority.259
Whether intentional or not, this ongoing creation of Supreme Court law
255. David H. Getches, Remarks at Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference
(Apr. 7, 2011), in 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 201, 203–04 (2013); see also Bethany Berger, Hope for
Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript
at 12) (on file with authors).
256. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
579, 582 (2008); see also Berger, supra note 255, at 10 (noting that the tribal record at the R
Supreme Court may be so abysmal in part “due to disparities in the extent to which the
justices understand and care about tribal and Native concerns”); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 57–58, 359 (1979) (noting derogatory
comments by Supreme Court Justices describing about Indian law cases).
257. See Mathew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L.
REV. 121, 132–33, 132 n.56 (2006) (citing numerous authorities); Berger, supra note 255, at 41 R
(“despite the two-hundred year history of tribes as a third sovereign, the Court has not yet
fully assimilated this history into a coherent legal theory.”).
258. Berger, supra note 255, at 38. R
259. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 145, at xxiv–xxvi; Robert N. Clinton, Redressing R
the Legacy of Conquest: A Vison Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77,
129–34 (1993).
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gives a new form of legal sanction to those neocolonial beliefs.260  This
approach is not even honestly colonial, because the original understanding
of the federal trust responsibility incorporated from international law into
the Constitution viewed it as juridically meaningful, as discussed above.
This approach is also subjective, expressing Justices’ own values and prefer-
ences untethered from the historical moorings of federal Indian law.261
This effort to redefine federal-tribal relations also diverges from the views
of the political branches, which are vested with constitutional authority over
Indian affairs, and which for almost fifty years have been more supportive
of Indian rights, including the federal trust responsibility.262  Further, this
disregard for history, established law, and congressional policy has been ex-
pressed without sound legal reasoning or a basic sense of justice.263  Most
notably, this apparent pursuit of “color-blind” justice subverts the special
treatment accorded Indians under historic federal law,264 even in relation to
the federal government alone.  To paraphrase Philip Frickey, the Supreme
Court has done little to promise effective solutions to practical problems,
and seems more normatively concerned about undermining the federal trust
responsibility and protecting federal agencies than it does about promoting
a viable framework for protecting Indians from federal malfeasance in the
twenty-first century.265
260. See WILLIAMS, supra note 145, at xxvii; Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Activ- R
ism: Neo-Colonialism and the Supreme Court’s New Indian Law, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 92,
98–100 (1991); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999).
261. See David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 291, 298 (2001) [hereinafter
Getches, Beyond Indian Law]; David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1573 (1996); see also
Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Its Importance and
Potential Ramifications, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Apr. 2012, at 6 (noting that “historical igno-
rance” of certain members of the Court may be troubling for Indian Country).
262. See Fletcher, supra note 257, at 128; Frickey, supra note 176, at 445; Getches Beyond R
Indian Law, supra note 261, at 291; Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and R
Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 759, 779–815 (2014); cf. United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205 (2004) (noting that prior relevant cases do not “suggest that the
Court should second-guess the political branches’ own determinations); Getches, supra note
255, at 202 (“How can the government, to paraphrase Chief Justice John Marshall, arrogate R
to itself these powers over people whom it simply surrounded with a kind of constructive
conquest?”).
263. Rebecca Tsosie, A Philosophy of Hope and Landscape of Principle: The Legacy of David
Getches’s Federal Indian Law Scholarship, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 155, 160 (2013).
264. Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 261, at 267. R
265. Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The
Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 8 (2002); cf.
Ablavsky, supra note 90, at 1085 (“Unlike the [Constitution]’s frequent (albeit oblique) refer- R
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This is especially challenging for advocates of Indian interests, who are
often the prevailing parties in lower courts and respondents before the Su-
preme Court, so that they cannot simply avoid the Justices.266  It also means
that the Supreme Court is not fulfilling its role as the counter-majoritarian
guardian for American Indian rights.267  Instead, while Congress and the
DOI and the DOJ have reaffirmed and sought to fulfill federal trust duties
when federal-tribal interests are aligned, the DOJ when defending the
United States against claims and the Supreme Court in reviewing such
claims seek to limit application of the federal trust responsibility.
Four recent examples illustrate these points, two expressly concerning
the trust responsibility and the other two also implicating it.268  First, in
United States v. Navajo Nation, the Executive Branch could only avoid liabil-
ity as discussed above because the Supreme Court accepted the DOJ’s mis-
representations.  That analysis has been widely criticized.269  As the late,
leading Indian law scholar David Getches summarized the decision, “[n]ever
again should we see the travesty of the Navajo coal leasing case, in which
the Supreme Court allowed connivance between the Secretary of the Inte-
rior and a coal company to suppress competitive pricing of the tribe’s coal in
a lease where the Secretary was supposed to act as a trustee.”270
Next, in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Supreme Court
again accepted various DOJ misrepresentations as discussed above.  The
faulty legal reasoning in that decision is clearly explained by Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent as well as by several commentators.271  As one scholar
ences to slavery, nothing in the constitutional text explicitly mandates an imperialist Indian
policy.  For a textualist, this may absolve the document from its unpleasant historical associa-
tions.  Yet in practice this absence has made the effects of this history all the more insidi-
ous.”); Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 591
(2008).
266. See WILLIAMS, supra note 145, at 162 & n.2 (noting strategy urged by various R
scholars).
267. Steele, supra note 262, at 803 & n.223 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, R
241 (1940)) (courts are “havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they
are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice
and public excitement”).
268. Other critiques of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ Indian law jurisprudence
focus on tribal jurisdiction cases, but the analysis applies equally regarding federal trust
responsibility cases, and is perhaps more pointed because no other competing sovereign is
involved.
269. See, e.g., Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. R.J. 317,
352–56 (2006) (detailed case review and critique); CITAR REPORT, supra note 82, at 22. R
270. Getches, supra note 255, at 205. R
271. Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. 162, 188–209 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Daniel W.
Hart, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Why the Supreme Court’s Refusal to Apply the
Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege Stands to Diminish the Federal-Tribal Trust Rela-
tionship, 36 AM . INDIAN L. REV. 527, 543–49 (2012).
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has noted, it is troubling that the Supreme Court overlooked or disregarded
the contracts between Indian tribes and the federal government under
which tribes gave up land and external sovereignty in exchange for the fed-
eral government’s commitment to the federal trust responsibility regarding
Indians.272  Here, however, the Supreme Court compounded those errors
by reversing standard presumptions and analysis for privilege claims on the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus.  Instead of requiring the Executive
Branch to show exceptional circumstances and a clear and undisputable ba-
sis that it was entitled to a privilege against discovery with no other ade-
quate means to attain the desired relief, as required under its own
precedent,273 the Jicarilla decision reads as if the relevant Indian tribe bore
the burden of proving a compensable breach of trust under a general trust
relationship without regard to the fiscal mismanagement at issue. In this
case, it remains unclear how the Executive Branch credibly asserted that
mandamus relief was necessary when there were other means of obtaining
relief.274
For Sotomayor[’s dissent], this [did not] even pass the smell test.
The government acts as a trustee and calls itself a trustee, but it
won’t abide by any of the traditional duties that go with being a
trustee unless it affirmatively accepts them.  In effect, the govern-
ment is using the word trust without feeling obliged by its defini-
tion.  “There’s no need to use the word,” Sotomayor tartly noted in
oral arguments, “because it wouldn’t be a trust.”275
Next, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl addressed a claim under the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA).276  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a non-
Indian couple in South Carolina that sought to adopt a young Cherokee girl
from Oklahoma over the objections of her father. It was clear how the Su-
preme Court would rule based on the derisive opening line, which disre-
garded the categorical nature of citizenship or membership in an Indian
272. Kronk Warner, supra note 261, at 4–6.  The Supreme Court could not have been R
ignorant of this despite the Executive Branch’s misrepresentations because the issue was
addressing in briefing. See Brief for Navajo Nation and Pueblo of Laguna as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (No.
10-382).
273. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (detailing the excep-
tional circumstances test for mandamus relief).
274. See Jicarilla VII, 564 U.S. at 206 n.11.
275. John Paul Rollert, A Matter of Trusts, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/12/there_s_a_lot_to_learn_from_a_lonely_dis-
sent_by_sonia_sotomayor_in_a_trusts_case.html.
276. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
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tribe as well as the relevant Indian tribe’s own authority to set its member-
ship rules.277  As explained in the Baby Girl dissent and elsewhere, this rul-
ing turned the law “upside down” and ignored the clear purpose of ICWA,
which was to keep Indian children with Indian families.278  This decision
also overlooked the lower court finding that there was no conflict between
the best interests of the child and recognizing the birth father’s parental
rights.279  Although this was not a federal trust responsibility case, it none-
theless illustrates the Supreme Court’s disregard for a congressional policy
designed to protect Indians.
Finally, there was no opinion issued by the Supreme Court in Dollar
General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians because it resulted in an
equally divided Court after Justice Scalia’s death.280  However, the tenor of
oral argument made clear that Justice Scalia and others could not seem to
countenance Indians tribes exercising jurisdiction over non-Indians on In-
dian trust lands leased from a tribe on their reservation, even with consent
to tribal jurisdiction in the contract at issue.281  Several Justices seemed to
have deep concerns with the fairness of tribal courts for nonmembers, and
the lack of removal to federal court or avenue for Supreme Court review.282
This deep doubt about tribal authority existed even though the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized broad tribal sovereign authority over their
own on-reservation lands,283 and has strongly supported arbitration for dis-
pute resolution where there is no opportunity for federal appellate re-
view.284  That skepticism also disregarded the right of contract for Indian
Nations.285  Also, Congress and the Executive Branch through both the
DOI and DOJ have expressed and implemented a trust responsibility to
support the development, operation, and enhancement of tribal courts, in-
cluding as “the” or “the most” “appropriate forums for the adjudication of
277. See Lawrence R. Baca, A Recipe from the Diversity Cookbook: ‘First You Hire One
Indian,’ THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Jan./Feb. 2017, at 54, 61, 76.
278. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct at 2573; Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child:
Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 310–18,
325–26 (2015).
279. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 566 (S.C. 2012).
280. Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
281. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 12, 25, 29–30, 34, 35, 38, 42, 45, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58,
Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-
1496); Berger, supra note 255, at 37.
282. Id.
283. Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache,
462 U.S. 324, 332–33 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140–41
(1982); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
284. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Contract and (Tribal) Jurisdiction, YALE L.J. FORUM, April 11,
2016, at 1 & n.2.
285. Fletcher, supra note 284, at 1. R
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disputes affecting personal and property rights on Native lands.”286  There-
fore, the resolution of Dollar General failed to defer to the political branches
and may reflect an accidental pause in the long history of Supreme Court
bias against Indians.287  This stalemate on whether to affirm the authority
tribal judicial authority on tribal own lands undermines, if not contravenes,
the federal trust responsibility to Indians.
Overall, the Supreme Court seems to be engaged in an internal debate
over the proper role the judiciary in the federal-tribal trust relationship.
Some Justices defer to Congress as the lead policy maker, as delegated by
the Indian Commerce Clause, while other Justices view their role as having
a more prominent policymaking function.288  Until this conflict in ap-
proaches is resolved, the Court’s decision-making will continue to be driven
primarily by outcomes—in other words, whichever party can secure five
votes—rather than predictable and sensible rules.
C. Episodic Congressional Action
Rounding out the branches of the federal government, Congress’ often
reactive nature, coupled with its slow processes, has led to episodic congres-
sional action.  This understandably inhibits further congressional recogni-
tion of the federal trust responsibility and rectification of executive and
judicial issues discussed above.  The late Senator Edward Kennedy de-
scribed this issue as follows in 1978:
[f]rom time to time in this Nation’s history, public attention is fo-
cused on the American Indian as though he had just arrived on our
286. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601(6), 3651(6) (2015). See generally Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3682 (2015).
287. See generally DEWAI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT’S
SILENT REVOLUTION 138 (2016) (predicting before oral argument that “the Court may unearth
new precedent, founded on presumptions and principles contrary to hundreds of years of
history, legislative debate, treaties, inherent sovereignty, and the Indian sovereignty doc-
trine, to sweep away tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on reservations”); WILLIAMS,
supra note 145; Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 261, at 278–79; Tsosie, supra note 263, R
at 161 (noting that the Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), “stretched to
find a justification to disclaim tribal authority to adjudicate”).
288. Compare, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031
(2014) (noting that precedents “ ‘defer’ to Congress about whether to abrogate tribal immu-
nity”), with id. at 2045 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Rather than insist that Congress clean up a
mess . . ., I would overrule Kiowa and reverse the judgment below.”), and id. at 2050
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In other areas of federal common law, until Congress intervenes, it
is up to us to correct our errors . . . . We have the same duty here.”), and Memorandum from
Justice Antonin G. Scalia, United States Supreme Court, to Justice William J. Brennan,
United States Supreme Court (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with authors) (“[O]ur opinions in this
field . . . . have rather sought to discern what the current state of affairs out to be.”).
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shores with new problems never before contemplated by govern-
ment.  There is a public cry for action. The wheels of government
begin to churn. Congress and the Executive Branch deliberate, and
then issue nice phrases about the final solutions to the Indian prob-
lem.  Finally, the difficulty of the task overwhelms us, our sense of
immediacy fades, our indignation wanes, and the Indian problem is
shelved for another generation.289
This same sentiment was echoed 14 years later in a seminal 1992 House
Report on the BIA’s mismanagement of the Indian trust fund, which played
a key role in the legislative history for the American Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act of 1994:
[t]he subcommittee’s review of the Bureau’s various management
improvement initiatives revealed that comprehensive corrective ac-
tions were rarely undertaken and almost never carried through to a
successful conclusion.  Instead, the Bureau has routinely compiled
running inventories of projects and initiatives without even at-
tempting to knit these efforts together into a cohesive framework.
Although the Bureau is chronically behind schedule—even on self-
imposed deadlines—it rarely bothers to justify or even explain its
delays in implementing corrective actions.  Indeed, the only thing
that seems to stimulate a flurry of activity at the Bureau is an im-
pending appearance by the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs
before a congressional committee.  Afterward, all reform activities
appear to suspend until shortly before the next oversight session.290
This habit of reacting to public outcries until those cries subside, while
doing little to address the underlying problems, may be recurring and obvi-
ously fails Indians.
Moreover, these issues likely have become worse over the last 20 years,
as the partisan rancor in Congress has increased while its legislative produc-
tivity has decreased.  As a result, Congress rarely addresses important na-
tional Indian affairs issues.291  For example, a recent empirical study found
that between 1975 and 2013, about 10 percent of Indian-related bills intro-
289. Hearing Before the Comm. of the Rules and Admin. on S. Res. 405 to make the Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs a Permanent Comm. of the Senate, 95th Cong. 13 (1978) (statement of
Sen. Edward Kennedy); see also VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 13–14 (1969).
290. MISPLACED TRUST, supra note 23, at 5. R
291. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 973, 990 (2010).
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duced and enacted were pan-tribal in nature, as opposed to tribe-specific
bills, appropriations, and general legislation affecting Indians.292
Various reasons may account for this limited congressional action.  Of
course, Indian issues are but one small set of issues on Congress’ plate. Also,
because Indian tribes and their issues are only located in some states, and
American Indian populations are small, many in Congress are not familiar
with Indian concerns.293  It is understandably difficult for Indian issues to
become material enough to warrant congressional action.  Moreover, many
in Congress may lack the sufficient background on the historic and technical
issues regarding the federal trust responsibility.  In addition, many Mem-
bers of Congress may not pursue Indian-related legislation because they
receive little electoral benefits from doing so, or perhaps even because they
only expend their resources and attention on constituents who have donated
to or contacted their offices.294  Furthermore, the limited resources of many
tribes may limit their abilities to advocate for legislation, while the large
number of Indian tribes and Indian policy issues may dilute the ability of
tribal advocates to pursue particular issues.295
Indian legislation likely also is affected by the same political forces that
affect other legislation.296  This includes invariable, general issues such as
the sometimes fickle nature of Congress297 as well as  “inside-the-Beltway
politics, including hidden holds, objections, or trade-offs based on issues
entirely unrelated to the merits of particular proposals.”298  Also, executive
support is the greatest predictor of legislative success,299 which may present
a particular obstacle here, because the Executive Branch is often averse to
most trust responsibility enforcement. Considering all these factors, it is
difficult for Indian issues to become material enough to warrant congres-
sional action.  Finally, some Members of Congress may share some of the
292. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 126 (2015).
293. See, e.g., Rob Capriccisoso, Rep. Daines Talks Cobell and the Need for GOP to Connect
with Tribes, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (July 14, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedia
network.com/2014/07/14/rep-daines-talks-cobell-and-need-gop-connect-tribes-155819?page=
0%2C3; BALL, supra note 287, at 154 (making a similar point regarding legislative efforts to R
address tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
294. Carlson, supra note 292, at 110 n.143 (citing KRIS MILLER, CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTA- R
TION IN CONGRESS: THE VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL (2010)).
295. See id. at 141–42.
296. Id. at 136 n.196 (discussing empirical data).
297. Fletcher, supra note 257, at 182, 183–84. R
298. See Eugene R. Fidell, Competing Visions of Appellate Justice for Indian Country: A
United States Court of Indian Appeals or an American Indian Supreme Court, 40 AM . INDIAN L.
REV. 233, 242 (2016) (noting these issues for proposals discussed there).
299. Carlson, supra note 292, at 142 (citing BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY R
CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 233 (2009)).
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executive and judicial concerns and attitudes discussed above.  All these cir-
cumstances help to explain the outstanding difficulty of congressional ac-
tion to better implement, explain, and enforce the federal trust
responsibility.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
What is the best use of the above information? David Getches offered a
sound assessment:
[i]t is tempting to write off the principles that worked to protect
tribal rights and lands in the past because they have been corrupted
in some applications, because they are imperfect, and because they
have questionable pedigrees.  But, I urge that these principles be
held up as the law of the land and made the benchmark for meeting
new and continuing challenges and setting the best practices of the
future. . . . Just as the earlier generations did not forget the funda-
mental principles and fought to return to them, so should future
generations.300
In light of the issues raised above, one option may be to press Executive
Branch officials and agencies to better honor and stop trying to avoid or
undermine their “fiduciary trust” obligations.  That certainly should be
done.  However, consistent with the constitutional provision of congres-
sional authority over Indian affairs, it must be recognized that Executive
Branch officials are only the “designated trustee-delegates” for Indian trust
duties.301  Therefore, while there is strong reason and good value for advo-
cating to Executive Branch officials for better compliance, the issues noted
here are so fundamental and long-standing that more is likely needed, as
President Nixon recognized almost 50 years ago.
Another option may be to appeal to federal courts, as many individual
Indian and tribal advocates have done many times previously.  This of
course comports with the democratic necessity for a strong and independent
judiciary that should protect those challenging government maladministra-
tion.  As President Lincoln stated in his first inaugural address, “it is as
much the duty of the Government to render prompt justice against itself in
favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between private individu-
als.”302  However, as should be clear from the discussion above, substantial
challenges remain for the foreseeable future in advocating Indian interests
300. Getches, supra note 255, at 206–07. R
301. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
302. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Dec. 3, 1861), THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29502.
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before the Supreme Court.  Moreover, while some have urged a
“postcolonial” approach to directly confronting Supreme Court with “the
racist way they are deciding Indian rights cases in twenty-first century
America,” others oppose such a possible approach because it might only
make things worse for Indians.303
What then should be done when the branch of government to which
Indians typically have appealed for protection from the failures of their
protectors does not provide the needed relief?  Resort to Congress is espe-
cially apt given its constitutional authority over Indian affairs and the Su-
preme Court’s apparent unwillingness or inability to identify or apply the
objective legal standards outlined above.304  As David Getches noted,
“[a]bsent a judicial rediscovery of Indian law, Congress will have to legislate
to correct the Court’s misadventures.”305  Resort to Congress also makes
sense because Congress is better able to develop prospective solutions that
may broadly account for the variety of tribal needs and interests, while the
Supreme Court is only able to look at particular cases and is “ill-suited to
provide solutions that address the diversity of tribal needs and
capacities.”306
Fortunately, a consideration of comparative institutional competency
suggests that Congress is better suited to make federal Indian policy deci-
sions.307  Congress is far better suited to addressing this key aspect of the
federal-tribal government-to-government relationship than the Supreme
Court, especially for consultation with over 500 tribes.308  Also, data sug-
gests that Congress in fact remains an active force in the creation of federal
Indian policy.309  Not surprisingly, many Indian nations have appealed to
Congress, hoping that it will enact more favorable policies.310  In essence,
when the Supreme Court has failed to protect Indians from their designated
303. WILLIAMS, supra note 145, at 162–63; see also id. at xxi-xxii. R
304. Steele, supra note 262, at 799. R
305. See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 261, at 269. R
306. Steele, supra note 262, at 809. R
307. Id. at 783–84 (concerning the scope and content of inherent tribal authority recog-
nized by the United States, based on constitutional commitment of relevant power, lack of
judicially discoverable, objective standards, the need for political accountability, and tailoring
solutions to balance competing interests, among others).
308. Compare Exec. Order 1,317, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments, §§ 3(c)–4, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,250 (Nov. 9, 2000) (requiring consultation
with Indian tribes for agency legislative proposals), with Indian Entities Recognized and
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 82 Fed. Reg.
4,915 (Jan. 17, 2017) (listing 567 tribal entities).
309. Carlson, supra note 292, at 171. R
310. Id. at 180.
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or delegated protectors, Indian tribes not surprisingly have appealed to
Congress, with its governing constitutional authority.
In particular, many in Indian country have long urged that Congress
should enact legislation to reform and modernize the federal trust responsi-
bility.311  Unlike the misguided trust repudiation proposal of 2007, this
would constitute an exercise of Congress’s “legislative role to advance, sup-
port, and protect Indians.”312  If Congress can overcome the institutional
problems that hinder its actions, it could significantly ameliorate the execu-
tive and judicial issues addressed above.
But what should Congress do?  Of course, any congressional action con-
cerning the federal trust responsibility should be undertaken only with sub-
stantial input by federally recognized Indian tribes, because such solutions
must be tribally driven.313  Based on the comparative institutional compe-
tence of Congress, any action by it here should be in broad terms, leaving
more specific application to implementation.  Also, the public comments of
many tribal leaders over the past several decades of trust reform efforts
allow mapping out at least some basic outlines of potential legislation.  As
explained below, these include strengthening federal trust administration,
promoting tribal sovereignty, improving federal management, and enhanc-
ing federal-tribal relations, all with sufficient funding and a goal of building
prosperous tribal communities.
A. Reaffirmation
One action that must be taken, and which numerous tribal leaders and
others have previously strongly recommended, is to make clear that federal
management of Indian trust assets is subject to strict “fiduciary trust” duties
consistent with historical commitments.  For example, the second recom-
mendation of the American Indian Policy Review Commission in 1977 was
that Congress should reaffirm and direct all executive agencies to adminis-
ter the trust responsibility consistent with a set of specific legal princi-
ples.314  From 2002-2005, when comprehensive trust reform was considered
by Congress, reaffirmation of federal trust responsibilities was also a consis-
311. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, 21st Century Trust Modernization
Forum (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.ncai.org/conferences-events/ncai-events/21st_Century_
Trust_Modernization_Forum_Final_Broadcast_-_Sidebar_Logos.pdf (sponsored by National
Congress of American Indians (NCAI), United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc. (USET),
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (ATNI), California Association of Tribal Govern-
ments, Intertribal Association of Arizona, and the Navajo Nation Washington Office).
312. Getches, supra note 255, at 202. R
313. Cf. Exec. Order 1,317, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Govern-
ments, §§ 3(c)–4, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,250 (Nov. 9, 2000).
314. AIPRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 11. R
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tent theme of tribal recommendations.315  Almost a decade later, tribal lead-
ers again recognized the “need to define trust and trusteeship. It is long
overdue for a very clear, succinct definition of what that means.”316  Finally,
in late 2013, after a two-year review, the Department of the Interior’s Secre-
tarial Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform, in its first
recommendation, urged that the United States clarify that all federal agen-
cies have a trust responsibility to Indians, that this trust responsibility de-
mands a high standard of conduct, and that each agency is to place Indian
interests before those of the agency and outside parties.317  Further details
of this policy recommendation might come from two Secretarial Orders
issued by the DOI and provisions of the DOI’s Departmental Manual,
which have outlined principles for the proper discharge of federal trust
responsibilities.318
B. Self-Determination
As noted above, Congress has repeatedly recognized the federal obliga-
tion to promote tribal sovereignty.  It also should be clear that the federal
trust responsibility supports and should not conflict with tribal self-deter-
mination.  Moreover, promoting tribal self-determination is simply sound
policy because Indian tribes are directly accountable to their members and
more aware of the problems their communities face.319  In addition, empiri-
cal research has confirmed that empowering tribal governments is an effec-
tive way increase economic development in Indian country.320  Just as
important, greater self-determination has long been a key point of tribal
proposals and recommendations for federal legislative trust reform.321  As
315. E.g., Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439 to Provide for Indian Trust Asset
Management Reform and Resolution of Historical Accounting Claims Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 109th Cong. 90–92, S. Hrg. Rep. 109-194, at 164 (2005) [hereinafter Indian Trust
Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439] (statements of Tex Hall, President, NCAI, and James T.
Martin, Executive Director, USET).
316. Fulfilling the Federal Trust Responsibility: The Foundation of the Government-to-Govern-
ment Relationship: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong., S. Hrg. Rep.
112-637, at 68 (2012) [hereinafter Fulfilling the Federal Trust: Hearing] (statement of Hon.
Fawn Sharp, President, Quinault Indian Nation).
317. CITAR REPORT, supra note 82, at 21, 24–25. R
318. S.O. 3215, supra note 55, at 2; S.O. 3335, supra note 57, at 2; DOI MANUAL, supra R
note 50. R
319. Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 100 (statement of R
James T. Martin, Executive Director, USET).
320. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF
THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 123 & n.283
(2007), http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic177572.files/SONN_Final_01_09_07.pdf.
321. See Indian Trust Reform: Hearing on the Views of the Administration and Indian Country
of How the System of Indian Trust Management, Management of Funds and Natural Resources,
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NCAI President Brian Cladoosby stated in a recent State of Indian Nations
address, quoting President Ronald Reagan from 1988: “ ‘Tribes need the
freedom to spend the money available to them, to create a better quality of
life and meet their needs as they define them.  Tribes must make those
decisions, not the federal government.’ ”322  Many in Congress also recog-
nize this point.323
Indian tribes already have statutory authority to enter into federal con-
tracts and compacts to administer some federal statutes, regulations, and
programs.324  There are additional mechanisms for tribes to implement
their own further trust asset administration, such as for surface leasing.325
There also is legislation allowing for tribes to manage their own energy
resources, but in the more than a decade since enactment, no tribe has used
it.326  There also is recent legislation that may allow broader adoption of
tribal trust asset management, the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act of 2016
(ITARA).327  However, that legislation is still so new it is not yet known if
any tribes have even applied for authorization under it.  Also, while its self-
determination provisions allow tribal trust asset management plans to su-
persede federal regulations, those plans still must be consistent with federal
statutes that are applicable to the trust assets or their management.328
Therefore, it may be helpful to have broader federal legislation that allows
tribes even greater latitude regarding trust asset management.  Of course,
this should include allowing each tribe to decide whether or how it wants to
participate in the management of its own trust assets, because Indian tribes
have unique capabilities, goals, and concerns.
C. Integration and Elevation
As evidenced by the fact that not all tribes currently have self-determi-
nation contracts or self-governance compacts, not all tribes likely will be
able to take over all management of their own federal services and trust
Might be Reformed Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong., S. Hrg. Rep. 109-16, at
17–18, 21 (2005) [hereinafter Indian Trust Reform: Hearing]; Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing
on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 164. R
322. Brian Cladoosby, President, NCAI, Remarks to the 15th Annual State of Indian
Nations 8 (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.ncai.org/NCAI_2017_State_of_Indian_Nations_Ad-
dress_Final_-2-.pdf (quoting President Ronald Reagan).
323. See, e.g., Senator James Lankford, Speech at NCAI Tribal Nations Policy Summit
115th Congress Executive Council (Feb. 13, 2017) (noting that the federal responsibility is
not to take care of tribes, but to enable tribes to take care of themselves).
324. 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (2015).
325. Id. §§ 415(e), (h) (2015).
326. Id. § 3504.
327. Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 5611–5614 (2016).
328. Id. §§ 5613(a)(2)(G), 5613(c).
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assets for the foreseeable future, if ever.  Therefore, it is critical that re-
tained federal administration of Indian trust management and administra-
tion be improved.  This is needed both to improve the welfare of individual
Indians and Indian tribes and to avoid repetition of the problems that have
led to so many tribal breach of trust lawsuits.  Moreover, while all federal
agencies bear trust responsibilities to Indians, the DOI is the primary
agency involved in discharging federal trust responsibilities for Indians.
Two key aspects of federal reform long sought by Indian tribes there-
fore aptly focus on DOI: integration and elevation.329  These also were ad-
dressed in the recently enacted ITARA.  First, the ITARA provides for the
preparation of a report within one year after enactment regarding the termi-
nation of the Office of Special Trustee for American Indians (OST) within
the DOI and transition of its functions to other bureaus or agencies.330
This responds to concerns that “the OST has outlived its statutory purpose
and is performing functions outside the scope of its authority,” and that its
continued operation has “caused greater confusion, burdens, and delays in
the processing of trust asset transactions for Indian tribes.”331
Second, the ITARA authorizes the establishment of an Under Secretary
of the Interior for Indian Affairs, who shall report directly to the Secretary
of the Interior.332  In addition to other duties that may be directed by the
Secretary of the Interior, the Under Secretary (if established and ap-
pointed) shall coordinate the transition of OST functions and supervise and
coordinate activities and policies of the BIA with activities and policies of
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Land Management, the Office of
Natural Resources Revenue, the National Park Service, and the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service.333  The Under Secretary also would “pro-
vide for regular consultation with Indians and Indian tribes that own inter-
329. See, e.g., Indian Trust Reform: Hearing, supra note 321, at 17–18; Indian Trust Reform R
Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 91–92, 96–97 (testimony by tribal leaders from R
NCAI and ATNI).
330. 25 U.S.C. § 5634(a)(2)–(3).
331. TO PROVIDE FOR INDIAN TRUST ASSET MANAGEMENT REFORM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
S. REP . NO. 114-207, at 12 (2016).  The OST was established by the American Indian Trust
Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, but not originally intended to be permanent. See 25
U.S.C. § 4042(c) (2015); see also Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, R
at 100–01 (testimony by James T. Martin, Executive Director, USET: “the ineffective dupli-
cation that has been created by the DOI’s stovepiping its lines of accountability and decision
making authority . . . is a critical issue that the trust reform legislation . . . must address”).
332. 25 U.S.C. § 5633(c).
333. Id. § 5633(c)(1)–(2)).  It is not known why this enumerated list did not include the
DOI’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement or the OST in case it is not
terminated.
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ests in trust resources and trust fund accounts.”334  The establishment of the
Under Secretary would address long-standing concerns that nearly every
agency within the DOI has some significant trust responsibilities, but there
currently is no single executive within the Secretary of the Interior’s office
who is permanently responsible for coordinating trust administration across
all relevant agencies.335  The establishment of this position therefore could
directly address some of the concerns that led President Nixon to propose
establishment of the Indian Trust Counsel Authority.
Because the ITARA only requires a report on OST transition and only
authorizes the establishment of an Under Secretary for Indian Affairs, it
remains to be seen how these recently enacted trust reform provisions will
play out.
D. Oversight
Next, Indian tribes have recognized that there should be a high-level,
independent entity with oversight authority to ensure compliance with fed-
eral trust duties.336  Currently, federal agencies—especially within the
DOI—are “in the position of being both ‘pitcher’ and ‘umpire’ for trust
administration.”337  Not surprisingly, Indian leaders have viewed accounta-
bility and reaffirmed standards as the cornerstone tenets of meaningful trust
reform.338  As Eloise Cobell testified, “[i]n all other trusts, there are, among
other things: . . . clarity of trust duties and standards; . . . and . . . indepen-
dent oversight with substantial authority to ensure that beneficiary rights
are protected.”339  As tribal leaders have urged before Congress, this entity
would allow for review of existing practices to support and improve best
practices.340  Also, because problems with Indian trust responsibility fulfill-
ment are not limited to the BIA or the DOI,341 such oversight also should
not be so limited.
334. Id. § 5633(c)(3).
335. E.g., Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 91–92. R
336. See Indian Trust Reform: Hearing, supra note 321, at 11–12, 17–18. R
337. Fulfilling the Federal Trust: Hearing, supra note 316, at 71. R
338. E.g., Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 90 (testimony by R
Tex Hall, President, NCAI: “[t]he very absence of those provisions is why we have the Cobell
lawsuit and all of the tribal trust lawsuits.”).
339. Id. at 234.
340. Id. at 92, 97–98, 100–01, 121, 155–62, 166–67 (testimony and submissions from
NCAI, ATNI and United Southand Eastern Tribes, Inc.).
341. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-317, HIGH-RISK SERIES: PRO-
GRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS 200–03 (2017)
(finding that federal agencies have ineffectively administered and implemented Indian edu-
cation and health care programs); Kevin K. Washburn, Advice to the Next Assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs, Indian Country Media Network, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 7, 2017),
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It is imperative that effective oversight includes tribal leaders. Indian
leaders best understand the problems and needs of their communities, ex-
isting issues with federal administration, and the opportunities for improv-
ing existing circumstances.  For example, the White House Council for
Native American Affairs established by President Obama by Executive Or-
der expressly recognized that “[g]reater engagement and meaningful consul-
tation with tribes is of paramount importance in developing any policies
affecting tribal nations.”342  However, that Council only includes the heads
of numerous federal departments and agencies, without any Indian or tribal
representatives.343  A number of tribal representatives have noted this defi-
ciency and advocated for addressing it, which the Secretary of the Interior
has acknowledged and sought to address in part.344  As some tribal leaders
have noted, using an expression that has been used in other political con-
texts, “if you are not at the table, you are on the menu.”345
Fortunately, there is a strong precedent for direct tribal involvement in
broad oversight of federal Indian affairs in the National Council for Indian
Opportunity (NCIO).  The NCIO was founded by President Johnson by
Executive Order coincident with his Special Message to Congress on Indian
Affairs.346  The NCIO was chaired by the Vice President and included key
cabinet members, as well as presidentially appointed Indian leaders.347
President Nixon later expanded the NCIO to add two more Indian repre-
sentatives and the Attorney General, so that there would be equal tribal and
federal representation,348 and staggered the terms of the Indian-leader
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/advice-next-assistant-secretary-in-
dian-affairs/ (noting that most of Indian tribes’ complaints concern matters outside the DOI,
such as with the Forest Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Departments of
Labor, Defense, and State).
342. Exec. Order No. 13,647, § 1, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539, 39,539 (July 1, 2013).
343. See id. § 3.
344. Toward the end of the Obama administration, the Secretary of the Interior allowed
tribal representatives to participate ins subject-matter specific subgroups of the White House
Council and allowed the President of the NCAI to attend a so-called principals meeting of
the White House Council itself.
345. See Barry Popik, “If You’re Not at the Table, You’re on the Menu” (Apr. 1, 2010), http:/
/www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/if_youre_not_at_the_table_youre_on
_the_menu/ (citing various uses of this expression going back to 2000).
346. Exec. Order No. 11,399, 33 Fed. Reg. 4,245 (Mar. 6, 1968) (establishing the
NCIO); cf. The Forgotten American, supra note 70 (discussing same, noting that “[t]he R
Council will review Federal programs for Indians, make broad policy recommendations, and
ensure that programs reflect the needs and desires of the Indian people.”).
347. Exec. Order 11,399, 33 Fed. Reg. 4,245 (Mar. 6, 1968).
348. Exec. Order 11,551, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,885 (Aug. 14, 1970).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA202.txt unknown Seq: 61 11-JUL-17 13:36
Spring 2017] Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians 457
members.349  The NCIO’s tribal leaders played a critical role in developing
the proposals that became President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress
on Indian Affairs.350
Senator Barry Goldwater explained the importance of the NCIO and
its membership between when the NCIO Indian leader members presented
their proposals at the White House and when President Nixon finalized and
presented his resulting Special Message to Congress:
[i]t stands as an elemental truth that an organization which is sup-
posed to be devoted to the supervision and formulation of our na-
tional Indian policies and programs should have a significant Indian
representation on it.  Clearly, the Indian Americans themselves
should be consulted and informed before major steps are taken
which will affect Indian lives.
Also, if the Council is going to prove capable of living up to its
promise, it must have among its membership the Government offi-
cials who hold the reins of authority over Indian programs.  These
members should be able to make commitments and put into opera-
tion the actions which will implement these commitments.
This is why the remaining members of the Council are all Cab-
inet-level officers.  Indeed, as I have mentioned, the chairman of
the Council is the Vice President of the United States.351
As Senator Goldwater reported, “the Vice President feels that the statement
of the Indian members of Council is a major document, because it sets forth
the definition of, and recommendations on, Indian problems by Indian citi-
zens themselves.”352  This was a pivotal occasion when Indians moved from
being the objects of federal policy to the makers of it.353  Still, the Indian
members there were presidential appointees rather than representatives se-
lected by Indians themselves, which may have been politically necessary,
though contrary to a basic principle of Indian self-determination.354
349. Exec. Order 11,688, 37 Fed. Reg. 325,815 (Dec. 5, 1972).
350. THOMAS A. BRITTEN, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON INDIAN OPPORTUNITY: QUIET CHAM-
PION OF SELF-DETERMINATION 162, 264 (2014).
351. 116 CONG. REC. 6,895 (1970) (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater).
352. Id. at 6896, 6896–99.  Based on the Vice President’s belief that the statement
should be available for a nationwide audience, the entire statement by Indian members of the
NCIO to the White House was printed in the Congressional Record. Id at 6896–99.
353. BRITTEN, supra note 350, at 55 (quoting NCAI Sentinel). R
354. Id. at 54–55.
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Unfortunately, the NCIO terminated along with its appropriation
around the time that President Nixon resigned.355  Also, to date there has
never again been a formal mechanism by which Indian leaders had such
access to high-ranking federal officials.356  Now is an appropriate time to
revive that institution in an improved form.  If this is accomplished, key
improvements could include having a legislative mandate and financial in-
dependence from member departments, to ensure greater objectivity in re-
viewing existing programs and considering new policies, as President
Johnson recognized.357  It also would be valuable to have Indian members
nominated by Indians themselves and with geographic representation,
rather than being purely political appointments, typically from the political
party of the President, as was done previously.358
E. Funding
As has long been noted, “all of the reform in the world cannot get the
job done without adequate funding.”359  That is certainly true regarding the
federal trust responsibility, because a basis for many past problems with
fulfillment of federal trust duties was the lack of sufficient federal funding.
As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has concluded in a congressional
mandated study:
federal funding directed at Native Americans . . . has not been
sufficient to address the basic and very urgent needs of indigenous
peoples.  Among the myriad unmet needs are: health care, educa-
tion, public safety, housing, and rural development.  The Commis-
sion finds that significant disparities in federal funding exist
between Native Americans and other groups in our nation, as well
as the general population.360
355. Id. at 260–61, 265 (noting funding ended on June 30, 1974 and Nixon’s resignation
in August 1974); see Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. 91-125, § 2, 83 Stat. 220 (1969) (“The
National Council on Indian Opportunity shall terminate five years from the date of this Act
unless it is extended by an Act of Congress.”).
356. BRITTEN, supra note 350, at 35. R
357. See id. at 59 & n. 44.
358. Id. at 50, 260.
359. Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 101 (statement by R
James Martin of USET); see also id. at 90–92, 168 (statement of Tex Hall, President, NCAI)
(noting chronic underfunding of the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
360. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET
NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY iii (2003).
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These issues have been noted for decades and not gone away.361  As the
most recent Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs has ac-
knowledged, “many existing programs are ineffectual precisely because they
are underfunded.”362  Moreover, extensive litigation between Indian tribes
and the United States has focused on the need for sufficient federal funding
for Indian tribes to administer programs formerly handled by federal agen-
cies.363  Therefore, regardless of whatever else Congress may do to reaffirm
and modernize the federal trust responsibility, it must ensure sufficient fed-
eral funding to implement it.  Not surprisingly, tribal leaders have long
recognized this problem and advocated for addressing it.364  Fortunately, at
least some in Congress recognize that this funding problem is a key cause of
perennial problems with fulfillment of federal trust duties and must be
addressed.365
V. CONCLUSION
One generally does not read court decisions on tort, property, contract,
or constitutional disputes that reference moral obligations.  Yet moral obli-
gations are referenced in federal-Indian disputes regarding the trust respon-
sibility, often paired with the characterization that it is not legally
enforceable.  But if the federal trust responsibility to Indians is largely just
a moral obligation that is not enforceable beyond the terms of statutes and
regulations, then it ought not be discussed in legal decisions.  But surely
there has been some legitimate legal reason for countless references to the
federal trust responsibility in United States court decisions going back al-
most 200 years.
As explained here, the federal trust responsibility is a fundamental
component of federal-tribal relationships, both historically and legally.  It
361. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) held a briefing in February 2016
for an update on its 2003 report, which remains pending. See News Release, USCCR, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights Announces Panelists for Briefing Related to Quiet Crisis: Federal
Funding and Unmet Needs in Indian Country, 2016 Update (Feb. 16, 2016), http://
www.usccr.gov/press/2016/PR_QuietCrisis2016.pdf; see also DELORIA, supra note 289, at 13 R
(“The conclusion of every TASK FORCE REPORT is that Congress is not appropriating enough
money to do an adequate job of helping Indians.”).
362. Washburn, supra note 341. R
363. See, e.g., Salazar v. Ramah Navajo School Board, 567 U.S. 182 (2012).
364. E.g., Indian Trust Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1439, supra note 315, at 92 (statement of R
Tex Hall, President, NCAI) (“[T]he BIA has never been provided with an adequate level of
resources, staffing and budgeting to fulfill its trust responsibilities to Indian country.”).
365. Senator Al Franken, Speech at NCAI Tribal Nations Policy Summit 115th Congress
Executive Council (Feb. 13, 2017) (noting that federal Indian programs are consistently un-
derfunded, and that Indian tribes are consistently failed by the federal government because
of those funding problems).
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was what Indian tribes surely understood and expected when they entered
into numerous treaties and later agreements with the United States, and
what federal officials surely intended when they made commitments of pro-
tection in exchange for most of the United States’ land and resources.  Also,
the trust responsibility is fundamentally what distinguishes federal-tribal
government-to-government relationships from relationships between the
federal government and states and among states.  That fiduciary responsi-
bility has a solid legal foundation in a range of well-established legal princi-
ples, including domesticated international law, constitutional law, contracts,
property, and of course trusts.  While the contours of the federal trust re-
sponsibility are spelled out and may evolve through case law, there remain
some irredeemable minimum and basic aspects of it consistent with its orig-
inal establishment, even though it has been violated repeatedly and over
long periods of time.  Finally, while history teaches that the trust responsi-
bility has not been fully honored in the past due to outright racism and
subordination of Indian interests to federal prerogatives, it remains a key
principle that should guide and shape future development of federal Indian
policy, even with ongoing efforts for greater tribal self-governance.
Indeed, many of the various common law threads that underlie the fed-
eral trust responsibility to Indians may be identified in a single statement in
one for the first leading Indian law decisions:
[f]rom the [preconstitutional] commencement of our government,
congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the
Indians [under the Indian Commerce Clause]; which treat them as
nations [as a matter of foreign relations], respect their rights [under
contracts and property law], and manifest a firm purpose to afford
that protection [i.e., trust duties] which treaties stipulate [under
contracts and international law].366
So what then for the present and the future?  While there are ongoing
issues with federal compliance with and enforcement of the federal trust
responsibility, it remains a fundamental principle that must shape future
federal-Indian relations.  Also, having a better definition and recognition of
the federal trust responsibility is not just an academic exercise, but has sub-
stantial real-world applications.367  Consistent with the long-standing rec-
ommendations by many tribal leaders and some prior experience, there are
substantial bases and opportunities for future federal legislation to help en-
sure that the federal trust responsibility has a vibrant future.  The trust
366. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 556–57 (1832).
367. See, e.g., supra note 3 (concerning the Dakota Access Pipeline and other recent, R
high-profile Indian issues).
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responsibility remains vital for American Indians.  Hopefully, with a better
appreciation for its legal basis and importance, federal officials will help
ensure that it is honored so that Indians may be better empowered and
enabled to thrive in the future.  The federal trust responsibility should be
not just be a weak shield to protect Indians from third parties, but a strong
one that also protects Indians from bad faith actions by the federal govern-
ment, as it was originally intended to do.
